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I. INTRODUCTION
Around the world, efforts by states to accommodate cultural pluralism
vary in form and vigor.1 Some multiculturalist states cede to cultural
minorities the authority to govern in certain substantive areas, such as
family law.2 Not surprisingly, feminists have raised concerns that a state‘s
reluctance to govern in areas traditionally seen as ―private,‖ and leaving
those areas of law to customary legal systems, leaves women within those
minority communities vulnerable to discrimination.3 The potential clash
1. See Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women’s Status: An Examination
of Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 65, 65
(2006) (explaining that in ―legally pluralistic countries,‖ traditional law (based on custom) and national
law (based on formal legal structures) ―exist side by side‖); id. at 91 (―Legal pluralism seeks to satisfy
and incorporate the world view of assorted segments of society, in particular, traditionally marginalized
cultural communities, by permitting the use of diverse, and often conflicting bodies of law.‖); John F.
Burns, Top Anglican Seeks a Role for Islamic Law in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at A10 (―The
archbishop of Canterbury called Thursday for Britain to adopt aspects of Islamic Shariah law alongside
the existing legal system.‖).
2. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Problems,
Prospects, and “Personal Laws,” 4 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 181 (2006) (examining equality discrepancies
between national law and the ―personal laws‖ governing the family law context in India); Oppermann,
supra note 1 (examining marital laws in Egypt, which recognizes religious laws such as the Islamic
Shari‘a, in South Africa, which recognizes customary tribal law, and in the United States, which
recognizes American Indian tribal law).
3. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 191 (―Out of step [with the equality jurisprudence
under Indian national law] is the judicial reluctance to apply sex equality principles to the personal
laws. To varying degrees, the personal laws of all of India‘s religions have contained facial and applied
sex-based distinctions to women‘s disadvantage. Yet in the family area, the courts often permit them,
even as the provisions are strained (sometimes to the breaking point) to provide an approximation or
appearance of gender equality in result. . . . [W]hen legislated in the family law context, facially sexunequal provisions are repeatedly permitted to stand.‖); Oppermann, supra note 1, at 91 (―While dual
legal systems may be seen as protecting a cultural minority in the case of the United States, reflecting
cultural diversity in South Africa, or endorsing fundamental religious beliefs in Egypt, they also allow
for the systematic maltreatment of women.‖); Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights in
Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 285, 289 (1998) (―Clearly,
when the state awards self-governance power over members‘ marriage and divorce affairs to identity
groups, it enhances their autonomy. At the same time, this delegation of legal authority also exposes
insiders who belong to traditionally subordinated classes, such as women, minorities within the group,
and children, to what I call the paradox of multicultural vulnerability.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
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between multiculturalism and equality has been the focus of much
theorizing in the last decade.4 Much of the discourse has been abstract,
polarizing, and minimally productive.5 Furthermore, the ways in which
women act with agency, engaging with and reformulating cultural policy,
has received insufficient attention. Many women value cultural identity,
even as they work to eliminate discrimination within their cultural
communities.6
The international human rights community, however, has not always
viewed women as committed, active members of their cultural
communities.7 By viewing African women almost exclusively as victims of
their culture, the international human rights community has historically
undervalued the potential for African women to reformulate cultural
policies within their communities.8 The two primary human rights treaties
for the promotion of gender equality in Africa, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (―CEDAW‖
4. See generally Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights
and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 483 (2002) (discussing the tension
between gender hierarchy in certain cultures and the rights of women in such cultures based on
international human rights norms); Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development
Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT‘L
L.J. 381 (2000) (examining gender inequality in development and human rights efforts in third world
societies in the context of property relations).
5. E.g., Susan Moller Okin, Part 1: Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 1999).
6. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1411–12 (2003) (―Confronted
with the same options today, women reformers in Muslim communities increasingly refuse to choose
between religion and rights and demand both.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
7. See id. at 1471 (―Having no context for conceiving the presence of religion and equality, we
discount as conservative or ignore completely the radically new frameworks for human rights [Muslim
women reformers] are building. In short, Muslim women are producing a new legal consciousness but
there is static on the receiving end.‖). See also Celina Romany, Introduction to RACE, ETHNICITY,
GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR ACTIVISM 11, 15 (Celina
Romany ed., 2001) (―Shifting multidimensional identities heightens the need for a human rights model
which addresses the complexities of the human condition.‖).
8. For a definition of culture, I rely on Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‗im, who states:
Culture is therefore the source of the individual and communal world view: it provides
both the individual and the community with the values and interests to be pursued in life, as
well as the legitimate means for pursuing them. It stipulates the norms and values that
contribute to people‘s perception of their self-interest and the goals and methods of individual
and collective struggles for power within a society and between societies. . . . The impact of
culture on human behavior is often underestimated precisely because it is so powerful and
deeply embedded in our self-identity and consciousness.
Abdullahi A. An-Na‗im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of
Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 19, 23 (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa‗im ed., 1992).
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or ―the Convention‖)9 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘
Rights (―African Charter‖ or ―the Charter‖),10 are dismissive of culture and
gender equality, respectively.11 The Protocol to the African Charter on the
Rights of Women in Africa (―the Protocol‖)12 attempts to remedy the
shortcomings of CEDAW and the African Charter and offers new hope for
promoting gender equality on the continent.13 In addition to strong
substantive rights, the Protocol provides important procedural rights to
ensure that women have a voice in the ongoing examination and
reformulation of cultural practices and customary law.14
By specifically providing for women‘s agency in the formulation of
cultural policies, the Protocol reflects theoretical advances in both the
conception of women‘s self-identity and the potential of dialogical
processes to promote rights.15 I argue that the Protocol offers African
feminists, among others, largely unexplored procedural, dialogical rights
that have the potential to engage women in the public discourse that shapes
African customary law.16 The dialogue is constrained, however, by the
power disparities among discursive participants, particularly traditional
leaders and rural women.17 For this reason, the value of deliberation is
limited in the context of African customary law, as is the applicability of
deliberative democratic theory.18 Recognizing that democratic deliberation,
or discourse more generally, is constrained in its ability to eliminate these
power differentials, I explore the ways in which discourse, as embodied in
certain provisions of the Protocol, may nevertheless be helpful for women‘s
rights activists in the region.19 Localized deliberation, for example, still has
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
10. African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217
[hereinafter African Charter].
11. See infra notes 88–90, 157–64 and accompanying text.
12. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/
Text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf [hereinafter Protocol].
13. See ROSEMARY SEMUFUMU MUKASA, THE AFRICAN WOMEN‘S PROTOCOL: HARNESSING A
POTENTIAL FORCE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 5 (2008) (―[T]he African Women‘s Protocol is a potential
force for changing the lives of African women for the better.‖).
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part V.A.2.
18. See infra Part V.B.
19. I engage deliberative democratic and discourse ethics theory in a limited sense here. Rather
than a full exposition of the theory, which is simply impossible in a work of this length, I sketch the
broad parameters of the theory in an effort to explore its practical value and application to a real-world
case—the struggle for women‘s rights within customary law in Commonwealth Africa.
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a role to play in identifying the most effective and viable methods of
implementing women‘s human rights. This approach embraces the
universality of rights but recognizes that implementation of those rights
benefits from an approach that is particular, context specific, and
deliberative. The Protocol, therefore, has the potential to engage traditional
leaders in dialogue about localized implementation of human rights norms,
which will lead to greater internalization of those norms at the local level.20
Part II of this Article outlines the limited success of CEDAW and the
African Charter in negotiating potential conflicts between multiculturalism
and equality. Part III explores the Protocol‘s corresponding potential to
effectively mediate such conflicts through its substantive provisions. Part
IV draws on philosophical currents within discourse ethics to argue that
inclusive deliberative processes, such as the procedural rights in the
Protocol, allow women to systematically engage with cultural meaning and
facilitate enculturation of human rights norms among traditional leaders. I
reject, however, a strong form of discourse ethics and argue that such a
model will not advance the cause of women‘s equality within African
customary law. Many proponents of discourse ethics do not adequately
account for the very real power disparities that pervade localized
discussions of customary law.21 Although discursive notions of the
democratic process are attractive because they seem to open a space for
women‘s agency, the theory falls short in its application because it is
insufficient to meet the structural discursive challenges that women face on
the ground.
For this reason, in Part V, I propose a two-part solution. First, in a
radical departure from discourse ethicists, I propose limiting the scope of
deliberation in the context of African customary law. I argue that dialogue
should focus not on norm definition, which is already largely accomplished
through the drafting and adoption of the Protocol itself, but on localized
modes of implementation. Even with this more focused discourse, states
and civil society have an important role to play in ensuring dialogical
fairness and minimizing structural inequalities among participants. Second,
I argue that litigation is a useful backstop in Commonwealth Africa when
dialogical political decisionmaking results in illiberal outcomes.
20. See Sally Engle Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law, 31
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 975, 990 (2006) (―The concept of vernacularization was developed to explain the
nineteenth-century process by which national languages in Europe separated, moving away from the
medieval transnational use of Latin and creating a new and more differentiated sense of nationhood in
Europe. Human rights language is similarly being extracted from the universal and adapted to national
and local communities.‖ (citation omitted)).
21. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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Women must have a voice in the implementation of equality standards
and cultural practices and norms. Effective, facilitated dialogue, together
with careful litigation, will allow women to shape the customary law and
cultural practices that dramatically affect their daily lives. The Protocol
provides a vehicle for improving women‘s rights through both litigation
and deliberative processes designed to encourage women‘s engagement
with and reformulation of the normative content of customary law.
Commonwealth Africa provides an illuminating case study.22 As
postcolonial states, many contemporary African governments continue to
negotiate the boundaries between state- and community-based law.23
Although these states were pluralist states well before British occupation,
the colonial authorities reified stratifications between state-sponsored law
and the law of the indigenous communities.24 During the colonial period,
British colonial authorities established a plural legal system in which the
―received‖ or British law operated alongside indigenous customary law and
religious law in certain areas like family law.25 Thus, for the indigenous
population, African customary law or religious law governed issues such as
marriage, divorce, custody, burial, and inheritance.26 To date, many
22. Commonwealth Africa includes the following countries: Botswana, Cameroon, the Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (departed in 2003). A
full list of Commonwealth member states is available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/
191086/142227/members/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
23. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in
Mozambique, 40 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 39, 45–46 (2006) (―Whereas in colonial society it was easy to
identify the legal orders and their spheres of action . . . in present-day African societies the plurality of
legal orders is much more extensive and the interactions between them much denser. . . . The
boundaries between the different legal orders become more porous and each one loses its ‗pure,‘
‗autonomous‘ identity and can only be defined in relation to the legal constellation of which it is a
part.‖).
24. See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 869, 869 (1988) (―Tribes
and villages had some law developed over the generations on to which formal rational law was imposed
by the European colonial powers. The imposed law, forged for industrial capitalism rather than an
agrarian or pastoral way of life, embodied very different principles and procedures. Scholars termed
these situations legal pluralism. They recognized that the introduction of European colonial law created
a plurality of legal orders but overlooked, to a large extent, the complexity of previous legal orders.‖).
25. See id. at 870 (noting that British and French colonial powers incorporated indigenous
customary law into the law they imposed, ―as long as it was not repugnant to natural justice, equity, and
good conscience‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Bart Rwezaura, Tanzania: Building a New Family Law out of a Plural Legal System, 33
U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 523, 524 (1994–1995) (―As would be expected, the majority of people for
whom indigenous law was applicable were African, while Europeans and people of other cultures
preferred Western law. Africans who adopted the Islamic faith also acquired an additional system of
law (besides African customary law) that courts could apply to them in some contexts.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
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African states have retained this structure of parallel legal systems.27
In the years since independence, some countries have attempted to
integrate or unify parallel systems of family law.28 Ghana, for example,
established a unified law of inheritance in 1985,29 although implementation
of the unified law has been spotty, particularly in rural areas.30 Similarly,
Tanzania passed a law integrating its marriage law under the 1971 Law of
Marriage Act (―LMA‖).31 Despite these and other examples of integration,
many Commonwealth African countries have retained fairly rigid divisions
between parallel legal systems.32 In a number of countries, those divisions
are in fact constitutionally sanctioned.33 A handful of Commonwealth
African countries‘ constitutions preserve the separation between statutory
and customary or religious law by specifically excluding the latter from
constitutional nondiscrimination protection.34 These constitutions, thus,
perpetuate the separation between public law and private, familial law, an
27. See Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth Africa, 31
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 289, 291 (2008) (―The history of colonialism in the region has created a plural
legal system in which multiple systems of law—statutory, customary, and religious—operate
simultaneously.‖ (footnote omitted)).
28. See Mark J. Calaguas, Cristina M. Drost & Edward R. Fluet, Legal Pluralism and Women’s
Rights: A Study in Postcolonial Tanzania, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 471, 491 (2007) (―The
movement for the unification of laws during the early postcolonial period in East Africa was most
pronounced in the area of family law, which had been particularly beleaguered by the choice of law
problems created by the plural legal system inherited from the British.‖ (citing Rwezaura, supra note
26, at 523–24)).
29. See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Special Report, Promise Unfulfilled: Law,
Culture, and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 259, 268 (2001).
30. Id. at 326–27 (citing as part of the enforcement problem a lack of knowledge about the law,
particularly in rural areas).
31. See Rwezaura, supra note 26, at 526 (describing provisions adopted in an effort to pursue
both reform and integration and accommodation of customary law).
32. See, e.g., Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Options
and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 635, 637 (2000) (citing
Botswana as an example).
33. Bond, supra note 27, at 290.
34. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, Art. 23 (1979) (Zimb.), available at www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/
constitutions/docs/ZimbabweC(rev).doc. Article 23 of the constitution of Zimbabwe states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section—
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of
any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public
authority. . . .
(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection (1)(a) to
the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters—
(a) . . . matters of personal law; [or]
(b) the application of African customary law in any case involving Africans or an African and
one or more persons who are not Africans where such persons have consented to the
application of African customary law in that case . . . .
Id.
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area in which the state will not intercede to prevent gender
discrimination.35 These states have embraced a strong form of
multiculturalism, ceding the authority to govern family law to local
communities and removing the backstop of constitutional
nondiscrimination rights.
The strength of this presumption in favor of particularity over
generality and universalism varies from state to state.36 Some states
embrace a weak form of multiculturalism in which deference to community
law is tempered by far-reaching equality rights or specific statutory
overrides, such as Ghana‘s integrated inheritance law.37 Wherever states
fall on this continuum, women within indigenous African communities
continue to engage with cultural norms, sometimes pushing them
incrementally closer to national and international standards of gender
equality.38
II. LACUNAE IN CEDAW AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER
Women value cultural identity.39 Although it seems axiomatic, the
mainstream human rights movement, which has historically been
35. See Bond, supra note 27, at 318 (―In countries that have retained constitutional exclusionary
clauses, for example, the state has carved out areas of law that are considered ‗personal‘ or ‗private‘ and
are not subject to constitutional scrutiny. This distinction between public and private was enshrined in
the independence constitutions when the non-discrimination provisions were drafted to specifically
exclude personal or family law from protection.‖ (footnote omitted)).
36. The debate over particularity/relativism versus generality/universalism in some ways
parallels the discourse surrounding multiculturalism and equality. This Article approaches culture and
its formation as a complex process, in which women have a vital role to play, rather than as a static
phenomenon that uniformly subjugates women. I have argued previously for a nuanced understanding
of women‘s identity that embraces the notion of ―qualified universalism,‖ which recognizes that
equality and discrimination will be experienced differently by different women depending on
intersecting vectors of subordination. See generally Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A
Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY
L.J. 71 (2003).
37. See Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 29, at 287 (noting that the law ―was intended ‗to provide a
uniform intestate succession law that will be applicable throughout the country irrespective of the class
of the intestate and the type of marriage contracted by him or her‘‖ (quoting Memorandum, Intestate
Succession Law, P.N.D.C. L. 111 (1985) (Ghana))).
38. See, e.g., Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 633 (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.mangaung.co.za/docs/Shibi%20Case.pdf (declaring section 23 of the
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 to be inconsistent with the constitution and invalid). In the Bhe
case, Bhe brought suit on behalf of her two minor daughters, whose father had died intestate. Id. at 594–
95. Under the Black Administration Act, ―the . . . children did not qualify to be the heirs in the intestate
estate of their deceased father.‖ Id. at 597. The court found that the principle of primogeniture violated
the right of women to human dignity as guaranteed by the constitution. Id. at 622.
39. See Coomaraswamy, supra note 4, at 484 (―Many women acquiesce [to discrimination]
because they see their group identity as the most important aspect of their lives.‖).
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dominated by Western, urban elites, only recently embraced this important
insight.40 For many years, the movement‘s majority cast women in
developing countries exclusively as victims of a foreign, exotic culture.41
Although women in the Global North struggled to resist discrimination in
their homes, workplaces, schools, and other venues, this discrimination was
not widely viewed as a manifestation of discriminatory culture.42
According to the Western view, gender discrimination in the Global North
was not embedded in the very fabric of social relations as it was in the
Global South, including Africa. Modern, Western liberalism came to be
viewed as ―cultureless,‖ and women in the Global South became defined
exclusively as victims of, rather than agents of or participants in, culture
and local custom.43
Defined broadly, culture is ―an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [and women]
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes
toward life.‖44 Although conceptually distinct from culture, customary law
40. See Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN‘S L.J. 89, 90–91 (1996) (noting that the ―theoretical dilemma‖ of cultural differences among
women ―has become a serious political hurdle for global feminism‖ and seeking to ―sort out the degree
to which feminism, by virtue of its own commitments, must take cultural defenses seriously,
particularly when articulated by women themselves‖). See also Karen Engle, International Human
Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST
APPROACHES 47, 49 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (noting that the critiques by feminists
in the Global South began around 1992 and ―often implicitly or explicitly critique the failure of the
previous stages [of feminist international human rights history] for their exclusion or false
representation of third world women‖). By ―mainstream human rights movement,‖ I am referring to that
segment of the movement that is dominated by elites, mostly from the Global North, who have the
greatest access to human rights institutions, such as the United Nations, and are therefore able to play a
larger role in shaping the international human rights agenda.
41. See Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject
in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6 (2002) (noting
―cultural essentialism‖ in which ―[w]omen in the Third World are portrayed as victims of their culture,
which reinforces stereotyped and racist representations of that culture and privileges the culture of the
West‖).
42. See Leti Volpp, Essay, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1186–
87 (2001) (―Part of the reason many believe the cultures of the Third World or immigrant communities
are so much more sexist than Western ones is that incidents of sexual violence in the West are
frequently thought to reflect the behavior of a few deviants—rather than as part of our culture. In
contrast, incidents of violence in the Third World or immigrant communities are thought to characterize
the cultures of entire nations.‖ (footnote omitted)).
43. Karen Engle states, ―Third world feminist critiques have also challenged the extent to which
structural bias feminism denies women‘s agency in its representation of women as victims.‖ Engle,
supra note 40, at 62. See also Sunder, supra note 6, at 1415–17 (describing a historicist view in which
religion and culture constitute ―law‘s past‖).
44. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 89 (1973).
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is a legal expression of cultural norms and values.45 Like culture,
customary law is dynamic and changes based on social, economic, and
legal developments.46 It is internally contested, and powerful elites often
determine the dominant cultural interpretation and provide what is seen as a
definitive interpretation of customary law.47 In many Commonwealth
African countries, the customary law of inheritance, for example, excludes
women as potential heirs.48
Although human rights instruments offer support to women who wish
to contest cultural interpretations, these instruments are not without flaws.
CEDAW was drafted in the 1970s, an era during which many women‘s
rights activists in the Global North focused rather narrowly on genderbased inequality.49 As a result, CEDAW privileges gender as an analytical
focal point.50 The African Charter is also the product of a particular
45. As one scholar explains, ―Sometimes termed customary law, indigenous law is the system of
norms which governs the lives of millions of African people, particularly (but not exclusively) in the
rural areas.‖ Thandabantu Nhlapo, Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: Taking Human Rights
and Cultural Diversity Seriously, 1994–95 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 49, 53.
46. Rwezaura describes one formulation of customary law as ―living law,‖ or the ―flexible and
highly negotiable, custom representing the law governing the actual social life of the people in their day
to day lives often changing in response to changing conditions.‖ See Alice Armstrong et al., Uncovering
Reality: Excavating Women’s Rights in African Family Law, 7 INT‘L J.L. & FAM. 314, 327 (1993)
(quoting Bart Rwezaura, From Native Law and Custom to Customary Law: Changing Political Uses of
Customary Law in Modern Africa (1992) (unpublished manuscript)). Nhlapo further notes:
Nowadays it is accepted that indigenous law has undergone profound changes through various
kinds of interaction with European culture and with both the colonial and apartheid states.
The process has led to the growth of ―official‖ customary law which consists of rigid rules,
embedded in judicial decisions and statutes, which have lost the characteristics of dynamism
and adaptability which distinguished African custom.
Nhlapo, supra note 45, at 53.
47. See An-Na‗im, supra note 8, at 27–28 (―A third and more significant feature of cultural
dynamism is the ambivalence of cultural norms and their susceptibility to different interpretations. In
the normal course of events, powerful individuals and groups tend to monopolize the interpretation of
cultural norms and manipulate them to their own advantage. Given the extreme importance of cultural
legitimacy, it is vital for disadvantaged individuals and groups to challenge this monopoly and
manipulation.‖).
48. See, e.g., Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to
Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19, 19.
49. CEDAW, supra note 9. See also Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking
Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57
EMORY L.J. 31, 52 (2007) (―[E]quality activists on the international stage sought to protect women‘s
rights to education, to physical safety, to health care, to national citizenship independent of that of their
marital partner, to broader political participation, and to full access to wage work. Those aspirations
became enshrined in [CEDAW], which entered into force in 1981.‖ (footnote omitted)).
50. This singular focus is not necessarily desirable. See Bond, supra note 36, at 72–73 (―With the
exception of some voices from the global South, the international women‘s human rights community‘s
focus on ‗women‘ to the exclusion of other identity categories, such as ethnicity, race, class, religion,
and sexual orientation, has resulted in a limited understanding of women‘s human rights.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
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historical moment, and its drafting was informed by anticolonial struggles
on the continent.51 Thus, the Charter‘s text privileges culture over gender
equality.52 The Protocol, in contrast to both CEDAW and the African
Charter, represents a more current view that explicitly values the positive
aspects of both culture and equality rights for women.53
When CEDAW was drafted, women were not seen as members of
religious and cultural communities, and many human rights activists did
not view women as active members or beneficiaries of cultural
communities.54 Combating a simpler, narrower notion of discrimination as
against women qua women, without attention to the multiple sites of
oppression in women‘s lives, is embodied in the Convention‘s text.55 Only
a handful of CEDAW‘s articles even address culture, and those that do
primarily treat culture as uniformly regressive and bad for women.56
51. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union and Women’s
Rights, 13 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 53–57 (2003) (describing the political movement
following the end of colonization). Specifically, ―[i]t appears that the Charter was conflicted from the
beginning given its attempt to reconcile deep-seated African values (which arguably subjugate women‘s
gender roles) and the emerging global values of non-discrimination and gender equality. In many ways,
the Charter embraced the . . . principle of protecting state sovereignty.‖ Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted).
52. See Deborah A. Wean, Comment, Real Protection for African Women? The African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2 EMORY J. INT‘L DISP. RESOL. 425, 456 (1988) (―[I]n the United
Nations, women‘s rights have been forced to take a back seat to human rights in general. African
women may realistically expect to face a similar problem in light of the fact that proponents of the
Charter seemed to be more concerned with the inequities of race than the inequities of sex in African
society.‖ (footnote omitted)).
53. Rosemary Semufumu Mukasa notes:
While the CEDAW‘s effectiveness was undermined in some quarters because it was
considered to be a western woman‘s instrument, the African Women‘s Protocol is a
homegrown instrument developed by African women for African women. On the other hand,
where the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) went overboard is in its
wholesale embrace of African traditions, values and customs without acknowledging that
some of these customs and traditions discriminate against and harm women; the African
Women‘s Protocol outlaws traditions such as [female genital mutilation], widow inheritance
and child marriages.
MUKASA, supra note 13, at 7.
54. See Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa: Human
Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 857, 857–58, 860 (1996)
(―Feminist theory and the knowledge derived from a common experience of subordination has exposed
the male-centered values upon which the international human rights framework is built. . . . However,
feminist methodology, particularly when applied to the cross-cultural magnitude of the world, must
guard against its essentialist impulses. . . . A feminist critique that merely focuses on gender or grants as
an afterthought the existence of other forms of subordination, retains the abstract contours of the liberal
self it aims to attack while politically alienating key allies in securing global social justice.‖).
55. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens:
Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3, 4 (Kelly
D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999) (noting that CEDAW ―has been criticized by many feminists
as being outdated‖).
56. See infra Part II.A.
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Because CEDAW largely fails to consider the power and meaning of
cultural and community membership in women‘s lives, it has the potential
to create a backlash in any given conflict between gender equality rights
and cultural rights.57
In the 1990s, a critical mass of women‘s rights activists in the Global
South, and a segment of the women‘s rights community in the Global
North—particularly activists from communities of color—popularized a
more complicated picture of discrimination, one that more accurately
represented their experiences of discrimination along multiple axes of
discrimination, such as gender and race or ethnicity.58 For example,
perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict often target women for
rape based on gender and ethnicity.59 Recognition of this type of reality led
to a better understanding of the intersectional, mutually reinforcing forms
of discrimination against women.60 Consistent with this more nuanced
understanding of women‘s experiences of discrimination, the mainstream
human rights movement also began to value the multiple aspects of
women‘s identities, including women‘s memberships in religious and
cultural communities.61 In its dismissal of culture as a potentially positive
aspect of women‘s lives, CEDAW thus fails to provide states and
communities with the tools to effectively mediate or resolve conflicts
between gender equality and cultural norms.62
57. In contrast, Article 17 of the Protocol, which gives women the right to live in a ―positive
cultural context‖ and the right of full participation in the determination of cultural policies, ―empowers
African women . . . . This provision provides African women with a tool to address one of the biggest
challenges for efforts to implement the CEDAW . . . the co-existence of multiple legal systems with
customary and religious law governing personal life and prevailing over positive law and even the
constitutional guarantees.‖ MUKASA, supra note 13, at 41–42.
58. Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139 (criticizing the separate nature of race and gender in single-axis antidiscrimination analysis and
arguing for multidimensionality); Trina Grillo, Symposium Keynote Address, Anti-Essentialism and
Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 16, 19 (1995)
(arguing that intersectionality is necessary to understanding the experience of gender); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that
―contemporary legal theory [including gender theory] needs less abstraction and not simply a different
sort of abstraction‖).
59. See Bond, supra note 36, at 113.
60. Id. at 74–75. See also Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race
Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 382–83 (2000).
61. See Sunder, supra note 6, at 1403 (arguing that ―on the ground, women‘s human rights
activists are piercing the veil of religious sovereignty‖ and that ―despite law‘s formal refusal to
acknowledge claims of internal dissent, women are nonetheless claiming their rights to challenge
religious and cultural authorities and to imagine religious community on more egalitarian and
democratic terms‖).
62. There are, however, several advantages to using CEDAW to promote women‘s rights. The

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

7/5/2010 1:36 AM

GENDER, DISCOURSE, AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA

521

The African Charter also fails to offer a meaningful mechanism for
women‘s rights activists in Africa to reconcile the conflicts that sometimes
arise between women‘s equality rights and the right to culture in
indigenous African communities.63 Because the Charter fails to
comprehensively protect women‘s rights, it offers African women‘s rights
activists very little ammunition in the struggle for gender equality.64
Although the Charter itself is of limited use, another regional human rights
instrument, the Protocol, offers new hope to activists in the region. With
more expansive rights protections for African women, the Protocol will not
only provide a new source for normative rights claims, but will also lead to
a broader interpretation of the more limited rights within CEDAW and the
African Charter. There are three primary reasons why the Protocol offers
significant promise for promoting women‘s rights in Africa, while
simultaneously respecting and promoting cultural rights and, particularly,
women‘s rights to define and redefine the normative content of custom and
customary law: regional credibility, strong substantive provisions, and
innovative procedural provisions. I discuss each in greater detail in
subsequent sections of this Article.
First, the Protocol offers credibility within the region.65 African
women played a large role in drafting and promoting the Protocol; their
participation offers a convincing response to charges of Western
imperialism.66 As Rosemary Semafumu Mukasa remarks, ―The Protocol is
CEDAW Committee, for example, is a well-established U.N. institution with a proven track record.
Some of the more recent regional instruments, like the Protocol, must rely on new or chronically
underfunded institutions for enforcement.
63. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 35 (noting that ―[a]nother area of inadequacy stems from the
charter‘s warm and wholesale embrace of African tradition and customs, without taking into account
the fact that some of these very traditions discriminate against women‖).
64. But see Ephrahim v. Pastory & Another, [1990] L.R.C. 757 (Tanz. High Ct.), reprinted in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TANZANIA: SELECTED CASES AND MATERIALS 387, 390 (Chris Maina Peter ed.,
1997), in which the Tanzania High Court relied on both CEDAW and the African Charter in upholding
women‘s rights against constraints of customary law.
65. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 113–14 (―Significantly, the Women‘s Protocol is also the
outcome of a political negotiation process between African heads of state, giving it an added degree of
legitimacy and credibility in comparison to other international agreements—it is an instrument that has
been developed by Africans for Africans.‖).
66. See Fareda Banda, Global Standards: Local Values, 17 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 1, 17
(2003) (noting that the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa was ―[a]
joint initiative of the African Commission and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF),‖
and ―was drafted by a working group chaired by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of African
Women,‖ following on the heels of other pro-woman subregional initiatives (footnote omitted)). Banda,
however, also notes that nongovernmental organizations (―NGOs‖) were excluded from the drafting
process at various points. FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 75 (2005) (―Although the Special Rapporteur‘s remit required her to consult with NGOs,
there were complaints from civil society, and in particular from West Africa, that they had not been
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a homegrown instrument developed by Africans for African women. It
legitimises the fight against gender oppression as an African struggle. No
longer can detractors claim that women‘s rights are transplants from the
western world with no roots in African values and norms.‖67 The concept
of the Protocol originated at a meeting jointly sponsored by one of the
leading regional women‘s rights organizations and the African
Commission, which forty-four participants from seventeen countries
attended.68
Second, the Protocol has strong substantive provisions for the
protection of women‘s rights in the region. Alpha Oumar Konare,
chairperson of the African Union Commission, observes, ―The Protocol is
arguably one of the most progressive and visionary rights instruments for
gender equality not just in Africa but internationally.‖ 69 Indeed, the
Protocol‘s substantive rights provisions explicitly value both cultural rights
and rights to gender equality.70
Third, the Protocol provides an intriguing, but infrequently discussed,
procedural right which, if properly operationalized, could lay the
foundation for an engaging grassroots discourse that promotes women‘s
voices in the ongoing process of cultural definition and the articulation of
customary norms. Article 17 states, ―Women shall have the right to live in
a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the
determination of cultural policies.‖71 By ―procedural‖ right, I am referring
not to a formal due process right but rather to a right to be part of a more
informal process of defining and articulating cultural norms. The Protocol‘s
procedural provisions open the door for systematic engagement with
traditional leaders concerning implementation of women‘s human rights at
consulted.‖ (footnotes omitted)). Although not a perfectly inclusive process, the drafting of the Protocol
afforded African women more of an opportunity to shape treaty language than that enjoyed by women
in the drafting and adoption of the African Charter.
67. MUKASA, supra note 13, at 5.
68. BANDA, supra note 66, at 67.
69. Alpha Oumar Konaré, Preface to BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL ON
WOMEN‘S RIGHTS IN AFRICA, at viii, viii (Roselynn Musa, Faiza Jama Mohammed & Firoze Manji
eds., 2006).
70. For example, Article 17 of the Protocol recognizes the positive aspects of culture and states,
(1) ―Women shall have the right to live in a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in
the determination of cultural policies,‖ and (2) ―States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
enhance the participation of women in the formulation of cultural policies at all levels.‖ Protocol, supra
note 12, art. 17. As Mukasa states, ―One of the Protocol‘s greatest strengths is that it is an African
instrument that outlaws negative traditional practices and enshrines the right of women to live in a
positive cultural context.‖ MUKASA, supra note 13, at 5.
71. Protocol, supra note 12, art. 17.
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the local community level.72
Before turning to the shortcomings of CEDAW and the African
Charter and to the advantages of the Protocol, however, a few caveats are
necessary. First, human rights commentators from the Global North often
discuss culture as if it existed only in foreign legal systems, where it
operates as a dominating force in the lives of ―other‖ women.73 Culture
implies ―other,‖ and in this popular hegemonic narrative, the West becomes
constructed as modern and free of the regressive and oppressive burdens of
culture.74 Women in places like Africa become simplistically characterized
as exotic victims of an uniformly regressive culture.75 There is a clear
colonialist and ethnocentric bias in this construction. The second caveat
reflects the recognition that talking about culture as conflicting with
equality implies that equality and culture cannot be coexistent.76 This is not
true. Equality exists within cultures, but real conflicts do arise; because
academics have struggled to reconcile these sometimes competing rights,
commentators occasionally leave the impression that they cannot and, in
fact, do not coexist.77 The final caveat I will offer stems from the difficulty
72. See infra Part III.C.
73. See Volpp, supra note 42, at 1198 (―The relative status of women across communities is still
used to assess the progress of culture. And the discourse of feminism versus multiculturalism assumes
that women in minority communities require liberation into the ‗progressive‘ social customs of the
West. The idea that ‗other‘ women are subjected to extreme patriarchy is developed in relation to the
vision of Western women as secular, liberated, and in total control of their lives.‖); supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
74. See id. at 1198–99 (―[T]he assumption that Western women enjoy complete liberation is not
grounded in material reality. Rather, Western women‘s liberation is a product of discursive selfrepresentation, which contrasts Western women‘s enlightenment with the suffering of the ‗Third World
woman.‘‖ (footnote omitted)).
75. Ratna Kapur observes that ―the focus on the victim subject . . . encourages some feminists in
the international arena to propose strategies which are reminiscent of imperial interventions in the lives
of the native subject and which represent the ‗Eastern‘ woman as a victim of a ‗backward‘ and
‗uncivilized‘ culture.‖ Kapur, supra note 41, at 6.
76. See Volpp, supra note 42 (criticizing the ―feminism versus multiculturalism‖ dichotomy,
which is premised on the assumption that the two are contradictory, as fundamentally flawed and
arguing that the dichotomy breaks down when we recognize that feminism exists within communities of
color and that gender-subordinating values are also valued and prevalent in Western culture).
77. Some scholars critique the application of a rights discourse to culture, emphasizing that
individual autonomy rights inherently undermine a cultural focus on community identity and collective
decisionmaking. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
Edward A. Smith Lecture for the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Mar. 12, 1996), in
RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, REINVENTING INTERNATIONAL LAW: WOMEN‘S RIGHTS AS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 4 (1997) (―Many scholars from the third world argue that
human rights discourse is not universal but a product of the European Enlightenment and its particular
cultural development. . . . Women are often seen as the symbol of a particular cultural order, as icons of
cultural purity. Critics argue that to grant universality to a strong set of women‘s rights might
undermine the cultural framework of a particular society.‖).
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of talking about culture in Africa from an outsider‘s perspective.78 This is
inherently problematic but should not foreclose the possibility of sustained
cross-cultural discourse. It is crucial, however, to talk about these issues in
a way that is both respectful of and deferential to those women whose daily
lives are most directly affected by customary law.79
A. CEDAW: THE PROBLEMS OF SCOPE AND RESERVATIONS
CEDAW has often proven to be a successful tool for improving
women‘s rights around the world. Activists have used the treaty effectively
in legislative reform efforts, test case litigation, and grassroots organizing
across the globe.80 It includes both civil and political rights, and economic,
social, and cultural rights.81 Although it was drafted in the late 1970s, the
document included forward-looking language that would later help to
dismantle the public/private distinction in international human rights law.82
CEDAW‘s inclusion of affirmative action provisions, or ―temporary special
measures‖ in the language of the treaty, has opened the door for
interpretations of equality that go beyond mere formal equality.83
78. See generally Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,
42 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 201 (2001) (arguing that the current, eurocentric human rights discourse contains a
―savages-victims-saviors‖ subcontext that undercuts the goals of the human rights movement).
79. For the vast majority of women in Africa, customary law serves as the controlling authority
in their lives. In Ghana, for example, one study revealed that 80 percent of women were married
according to customary law. See Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 29, at 284 (―Notwithstanding the
existence of . . . alternatives, eighty percent of marriages in Ghana are still celebrated under customary
law which makes little provision for widows.‖ (footnote omitted)).
80. See generally U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, BRINGING EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (Ilana
Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998) [hereinafter BRINGING EQUALITY HOME].
81. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 1 (affirming the right of all women to equal exercise of ―human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field). See
also Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 263, 266 (2002).
82. See Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court:
Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271, 275–76 (2003) (―[CEDAW‘s] substantive provisions target
not only intentional acts of discrimination but acts which effect substantive inequalities; they reach both
private and state conduct; and they obligate states not merely to refrain from discrimination but actively
to seek to redress and remedy private discrimination against women.‖ (footnote omitted)).
83. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 4 (providing that ―temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating the de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination‖).
The adoption of such measures ―requires states parties ‗to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women with a view to achieving women‘s de jure and de facto equality with men in the enjoyment of
their human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘‖ See Rebecca J. Cook & Susannah Howard,
Accommodating Women’s Differences Under the Women’s Anti-Discrimination Convention, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1039, 1044–45 (2007) (quoting U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 25: On Article 4, para. 4 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html). It ―proposes evolution beyond the male
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Although its successes are noteworthy, CEDAW is not without flaws.
As a document drafted in the late 1970s, it largely reflects a ―secondgeneration‖ feminist understanding of gender as the primary—if not sole—
site of oppression.84 It fails to acknowledge that women may face multiple
forms of discrimination, such as that based on, among other things, race,
ethnicity, culture, religion, or sexual orientation.85 Similarly, it does not
reflect the multidimensional and intersectional role of African women as
both members of their cultural communities and as advocates for gender
equality within those communities.86
CEDAW, in fact, rarely mentions culture. The only positive reference
to culture appears in Article 13, which provides that women should enjoy
an equal right to ―participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects
of cultural life.‖87 Other references to culture appear in Article 5, which
prohibits gender stereotyping.88 Article 2 contains another passing
reference to culture and the states‘ obligations to change culture to conform
to equality norms.89 With the exception of Article 13, CEDAW treats
culture as a uniformly negative influence on women‘s lives. It largely fails
to recognize the possibility of a positive culture that benefits women—as
well as men—by providing a sense of community and identity that stems
from association with others who share foundational values.90 Sally Engle
Merry comments, ―When [CEDAW] committee members or the
convention invoke culture in CEDAW proceedings, it is more often as an
obstacle to change than as a resource or a mode of transformation.‖91
Merry argues that by treating culture as a static obstacle rather than as a
fluid source for transformation, as the CEDAW experts sometimes do,
comparator or reference point as the standard for determining equality.‖ Id. at 1046 (footnote omitted).
84. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 50.
86. See supra notes 54, 57 and accompanying text.
87. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 13(c).
88. Id. art. 5(a) (stating that states parties agree ―[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes
or on stereotyped roles for men and women‖).
89. Article 2(f) of CEDAW requires states parties ―[t]o take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women.‖ Id. art. 2(f).
90. See Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship
and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49, 49 (2005) (noting that ―minority group
members may wish to benefit from affiliation with more than one legal and cultural system‖ (emphasis
added)).
91. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 91 (2006). Merry also notes that ―[CEDAW] experts tend to
see culture as a barrier to women‘s human rights.‖ Id. at 90.
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members of the CEDAW Committee (―the Committee‖) miss a valuable
opportunity to reformulate culture in a way that promotes women‘s
equality rights.92 CEDAW‘s limited view of culture, as expressed in the
text of the treaty and by some Committee experts, contributes to backlash
against the treaty and interferes with implementation and internalization of
gender equality norms in the African region.93 Indeed, ―[a] more nuanced
critique of particular practices or gender stereotypes is less likely to evoke
nationalist defenses and justifications and more likely to build on local
movements of resistance and contestation.‖94
The Committee has attempted to address the conflict that sometimes
arises between culture and equality through its general recommendations to
CEDAW‘s provisions.95 Although there is no general recommendation
devoted exclusively to the messy issues that arise in the context of equality
and culture, the issue does surface within the context of several
recommendations. General Recommendation 21, for example, addresses
equality in marriage and states, ―Whatever form [the family] takes, and
whatever the legal system, religion, custom or tradition within the country,
the treatment of women in the family both at law and in private must
accord with the principles of equality and justice for all people.‖96
92. See id. at 91–92 (―When culture is discussed as a resource, or when there is recognition that
the goal of the CEDAW process is cultural reformulation, a far more fluid and contested idea is
implied.‖).
93. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that ―CEDAW‘s effectiveness is undermined‖
because it is often ―considered to be a Western women‘s instrument‖); Ravi Mahalingam, Women’s
Rights and the “War on Terror”: Why the United States Should View the Ratification of CEDAW as an
Important Step in the Conflict with Militant Islamic Fundamentalists, 34 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 171, 195
(2004) (noting that ―[t]he most significant reservations to CEDAW have come from Islamic countries,‖
which have taken ―a cultural relativist approach‖ and ―argu[ed] that CEDAW represents the active
imposition of western secular values or ‗cultural imperialism‘ upon non-western countries‖ (footnote
omitted)). The Protocol, by contrast, explicitly values the positive aspects of culture (in Article 17) and
narrowly tailors its critique of custom and culture to those aspects which are ―harmful.‖ See MUKASA,
supra note 13, at 41 (―Furthermore, Article 17 empowers African women by giving them the right to
live in a positive cultural context and to enhance participation in the determination of cultural policies.
This provision provides African women with a tool to address one of the biggest challenges for efforts
to implement the CEDAW . . . .‖). The Protocol defines ―harmful practices‖ as ―all behaviour, attitudes
and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right
to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity.‖ Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1(g).
94. MERRY, supra note 91, at 100.
95. General recommendations ―are documents explaining how a particular treaty should be
interpreted and applied.‖ WOMEN, LAW & DEV. INT‘L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN‘S RIGHTS
PROJECT, WOMEN‘S HUMAN RIGHTS STEP BY STEP 170 (Margaret A. Schuler & Dorothy Q. Thomas
eds., 1997).
96. U.N. Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
No. 21, para. 13 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/
recomm.htm#recom21.
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Similarly, the general recommendations that address violence against
women and female genital mutilation also argue, correctly albeit
simplistically, that states should not allow custom or culture to justify these
harmful practices.97 Despite the Committee‘s willingness to address
conflicts between custom and equality in its general recommendations, the
treaty itself is less effective than some regional and subregional initiatives,
which directly address the potential conflict between culture and equality
rights in the text of the treaties themselves and consider the importance of
local context.98
In addition to these textual shortcomings, CEDAW also suffers from
substantive problems. States parties‘ reservations to CEDAW‘s substantive
provisions often shield family law and customary or religious law from
scrutiny by international monitoring bodies, such as the Committee. A
large number of states parties have entered significant reservations to the
treaty, including some reservations to core treaty provisions.99 A few states,
for example, have made reservations to Article 2 of the Convention, which
contains a broad obligation to change laws and practices to conform to the
equality standard embodied in the treaty.100 Many more states have made
reservations to Article 16, which obligates states to eliminate
97. See U.N. Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 14 (1990), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
recommendations/recomm.htm#recom14 (noting that ―continuing cultural, traditional and economic
pressures . . . help to perpetuate harmful practices‖); U.N. Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, para. 24(e) (1992), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19 (―States parties in their reports
should identify the nature and extent of attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate violence against
women . . . .‖).
98. MERRY, supra note 91, at 104 (―The [C]ommittee‘s lack of attention to local situations
impedes productive collaboration with grassroots activists . . . .‖).
99. See Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to the Domestic Application of Women’s
International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 351, 352 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (―[A]lthough over 120 states have ratified the
Convention, many have done so conditionally. Approximately 40 states have made a total of roughly
105 reservations and declarations to the convention. Many of the substantive reservations are wideranging and profoundly affect the integrity of the Convention.‖); Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT‘L L. 643,
644 (1990) (noting that CEDAW is ―among the most heavily reserved of international human rights
conventions‖).
100. See Vedna Jivan & Christine Forster, What Would Gandhi Say? Reconciling Universalism,
Cultural Relativism and Feminism Through Women’s Use of CEDAW, 9 SING. Y.B. INT‘L L. 103, 108
(2005) (―As of November 2002, fifty-five State parties had entered reservations to
CEDAW. . . . Reservations to CEDAW, however, are most often made on the grounds that national law,
tradition, religion or culture are incongruent with some of its articles or principles. Thus, most of the
reservations lodged relate to Articles 2, 5 or 16. Article 2 identifies the range of measures that State
parties should take to eliminate gender discrimination.‖ (footnote omitted)).

DO NOT DELETE

528

7/5/2010 1:36 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:509

discrimination within marriage and family life.101 These reservations
contravene the ―object and purpose‖ of the treaty and should be
discouraged through aggressive objections by other states parties.102
Otherwise, reservations such as these will continue to hamper
implementation of the treaty.
Despite the proliferation of reservations to the treaty, CEDAW has
made a positive contribution to women‘s rights in the region.103 Because
there have been few women‘s rights cases involving challenges to
customary law in the region, it is difficult to generalize about CEDAW‘s
effectiveness in reforming customary law. In some cases, the treaty has
clearly proved to be an important resource for women‘s rights activists
campaigning for legal reform in the region. In others, the treaty has been
unpersuasive in domestic courts. The Protocol, however, provides an
important new source of women‘s human rights law in the region and
supplements CEDAW in crucial ways, as I discuss below.
B. CEDAW IN AFRICAN TEST CASE LITIGATION
The 1990s were a period of explosive constitutional reform throughout
Africa.104 Although some were ineffective, many of the new constitutions
101. See Yakaré-Oulé Jansen, The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology: Reproductive
Rights and Sexual Self-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REV. 311, 323–24 (2007) (―According to General
Recommendation 21 . . . , no reservations can be made to [Article 16, regarding marriage and family
planning], as that would be inconsistent with the principles of CEDAW. Yet, as practice has shown, this
article is a favorite amongst State Parties when it comes to reservations and declarations of
interpretation.‖ (footnotes omitted)); Marie Egan Provins, Note, Constructing an Islamic Institute of
Civil Justice That Encourages Women’s Rights, 27 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 515, 522–23
(2005) (noting that even though the committee declared ―reservations to Article 16 . . . incompatible
with CEDAW and thus impermissible,‖ ―[s]ignificantly, twelve parties have made reservations to
CEDAW Article 2 and/or Article 16, explicitly asserting that these provisions are incompatible with
Sharia‖ (footnotes omitted)).
102. Cf. Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the
Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 99, 127 (1995/1996) (noting the ―lack of
reaction to the reservations by other parties‖ to CEDAW and arguing that ―[s]tate objections to
reservations under [CEDAW] are especially important, since they are the principal means of raising
questions regarding the permissibility of reservations‖ and ―the Committee lacks authority to compel
states to abandon even impermissible reservations‖ (footnote omitted)).
103. See Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human Rights and African Women: A Comparison of Protection
Under Two Major Treaties, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 549, 573 (1993) (―Progress in greater women‘s rights in
Africa, though slow, can be seen in the application of [CEDAW] and the African Charter.‖).
104. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Constitutionalism in Africa: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,
Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES 1, 1
(J. Oloka-Onyango ed., 2001) (―Recent reverberations of constitutional discourse, engineering and
contestation in countries as disparate and diverse as Côte d‘Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Egypt and
Benin, speak loudly to the fact that at the commencement of the twenty-first century, issues of
constitutionalism in Africa have gained considerable prominence. . . . Indeed, with only slight
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included important human rights guaranties.105 New constitutions with
strong rights protections led to test case litigation to enforce such
guaranties. Many of the plaintiffs in gender equality cases arising under the
new African constitutions bolstered their gender equality claims with
references to international treaties such as CEDAW.106 For many judges,
who were tasked with interpreting the new constitutions, it was useful to
appeal to CEDAW as support for some of the region‘s landmark decisions
promoting gender equality.107
In Dow v. Attorney General, the Botswana High Court considered
Botswana‘s constitutional and international human rights obligations in
determining whether a Botswana woman married to a foreign national
could pass on citizenship to her children.108 The plaintiff, Unity Dow, was
a lawyer and activist who married an American, with whom she had three
children.109 In 1984, the Botswana legislature passed the Botswana
Citizenship Act, which dictated that the nationality of a father of a child
trepidation, we could describe the present developments as constituting a new epoch in African
history—the epoch of the rebirth of constitutionalism.‖); H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa:
Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239,
1275 (2006) (―Postcolonial Africa‘s first ever prodemocracy constitutional moment had finally arrived,
and the 1990s would be characterized by vigorous constitution-making . . . .‖); H. Kwasi Prempeh,
Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency in
Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 769 (2008) (―[Significant] transitions from
presidential autocracy to constitutional democracy . . . took place across Africa over the course of the
1990s.‖ (footnote omitted)). See also Charles Manga Fombad, A Preliminary Assessment of the
Prospects for Judicial Independence in Post-1990 African Constitutions, PUB. L., Summer 2007, 233,
233 (noting that ―[c]onstitutional reforms have dominated all political discourse in Africa since . . . the
early 1990s‖).
105. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‗im, Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African
Contexts, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE
FOR OURSELVES 1, 18 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‗im ed., 2003) (explaining that although most African
constitutions protect civil and political rights, for example, many of these rights guaranties are
ineffective in their application).
106. Cf. Penelope Andrews, “Democracy Stops at My Front Door”: Obstacles to Gender Equality
in South Africa, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 15, 23 (explaining that in considering cases dealing with
equality under the South African constitution, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ―has
incorporated international human rights law, and in particular [CEDAW], in its interpretation of
equality.‖ (footnote omitted)).
107. See Lisa C. Stratton, Note, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality
Laws, 77 MINN. L. REV. 195, 232 (1992) (noting that ―[p]erhaps the most accessible option‖ for using
international law to challenge discriminatory nationality provisions ―is the increased use of international
standards in domestic courts to inform and interpret domestic law‖ (footnote omitted)).
108. Dow v. Attorney Gen., [1991] L.R.C. 574 (Bots.), reprinted in UNITY DOW, THE
CITIZENSHIP CASE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA VS UNITY DOW 30
(1995), available at http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/fulltext/dow1.htm. (The case is also reprinted
in 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 614 app. (1991)).
109. DOW, supra note 108, at 30.
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born in Botswana would determine the nationality of the child.110 Under the
Act, the mother‘s nationality was irrelevant if the child was born in
wedlock.111 Because two of Dow‘s children were born after 1984, those
children automatically acquired the citizenship of their father and were
denied Botswana citizenship.112 Dow challenged the law on the ground
that, inter alia, it discriminated against women in contravention of the
Botswana constitution.113 The constitution, however, contained no explicit
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.114 Dow argued, and
the Botswana High Court found, however, that the constitution implicitly
prohibited sex discrimination.115 Although Botswana had not yet ratified
CEDAW, the court relied on other international women‘s rights
commitments, including the African Charter, and cited the precursor to
CEDAW, the 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women.116
Similarly, in Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels,117 Sara H. Longwe,
110. Id. at 30 (―Sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1984 read as follows: ‗4.(1) A person
born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth and descent if, at the time of his birth[] (a) his
father was a citizen of Botswana; or (b) in the case of a person out of wedlock, his mother was a citizen
of Botswana.‘‖).
111. Id.
112. Id. ―These two children required residence permits to stay in the country, could leave the
country only on their father‘s passport, would not be allowed to vote, and would be denied the free
university education available to citizens.‖ BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 80, at 20.
113. Applicant’s Notice of Motion, Dow, [1991] L.R.C. 574, reprinted in DOW, supra note 108, at
3, 3 (declaring Sections 4, 5 and 13 of the Citizenship Act to be ―ultra vires Section 7 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Botswana‖).
114. DOW, supra note 108, at 38 (noting that defense counsel had argued that the
antidiscrimination provisions of Botswana‘s constitution related primarily to discrimination on the basis
of race).
115. Id. at 39 (―[T]he time that women were treated as chattels or were there to obey the whims
and wishes of males is long past and it would be offensive to modern thinking and the spirit of the
Constitution to find that the Constitution was framed deliberately to permit discrimination on the
grounds of sex.‖).
116. Id. at 39–40. See also BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 80, at 20–21; Stratton, supra
note 107, at 230–31 (―The High Court judgment also reflects the success of Dow‘s strategy of
highlighting Botswana‘s international obligations. When confronted with two plausible constitutional
interpretations, the judge cited these obligations as requiring an interpretation consistent with the
treaties and with case law from other Commonwealth jurisdictions. . . . In holding for Dow on the claim
of degrading treatment, he referred to the definition of discrimination in the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that Dow cited as proof of an evolving
standard of the nature of degrading treatment. . . . The judge considered his view strengthened by
Botswana‘s status as State Party to the African Charter of Human And Peoples‘ Rights, even though he
acknowledged that the convention did not compel the ruling.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
117. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light
and Shadow, 51 J. AFRICAN L. 39, 60 (2007) (discussing Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels [1993] 4
L.R.C. 221 (Zambia High Ct.)).
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who is a women‘s rights activist in Zambia, successfully challenged the
Intercontinental Hotel‘s policy of refusing entry to women unless they had
male escorts.118 Longwe was prevented from entering the hotel on at least
two occasions—once when she was picking up her children from a party at
the hotel and again when she was attending a meeting of a group of
women‘s rights activists at the hotel.119 The Zambian High Court agreed
with Longwe‘s contention that the hotel‘s policy discriminated against
women in violation of CEDAW and Zambia‘s constitution.120
In cases concerning customary law issues, some courts have found
CEDAW provisions, which clearly privilege gender equality over cultural
rights, to be unpersuasive.121 For example, in Magaya v. Magaya, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe was not persuaded by the invocation of
CEDAW.122 In that case, a man died intestate, leaving behind two wives,
four children, a house, and some cattle.123 A local court appointed his
daughter from his first wife, Venia Magaya, to be the heir to the estate.124
Under the relevant customary law, however, men are preferred over women
in the inheritance of property.125 When one of her brothers challenged the
appointment, the magistrate court upheld the challenge and appointed him
as heir.126
On appeal, Magaya argued that the nondiscrimination provisions in
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Although clearly a victory for women‘s rights activists in Zambia, including Longwe
herself, Longwe commented that enforcement of the decision took a long time. Conversation with Sara
Longwe, in Beijing, P.R.C. (Aug. 1995).
121. See, e.g., Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb.), available at http://jurisafrica.org/
docs/lawreports/Magaya%20v%20Magaya.judgment.pdf.
122. See id. at 41–42 (noting that even if sections 1 and 2 of the Zimbabwe Constitution were
interpreted as prohibiting gender discrimination ―on account of Zimbabwe‘s adherence to[] gender
equality enshrined in international human rights instruments, there [are] exceptions to the provisions‖ in
section 23(3)(b) of the Constitution, by which certain matters are ―exempted from the discrimination
provisions‖ (emphasis omitted)).
123. Id. at 38.
124. Id. at 39 (―Soon after the death of the deceased the appellant, with the support of her mother
and three other relations, went to claim the [heirship] of the estate in [the] community court and it was
granted to her.‖).
125. See id. at 39, 41 (quoting section 68(1) of the Administration of Estates Act as providing, ―If
any African []who has contracted a marriage according to African law or custom or who, being
unmarried, is the offspring of parents married according to African law or custom, dies intestate his
estate shall be administered and distributed according to the customs and usages of the tribe or people to
which he belonged,‖ and stating, ―What is common and clear from the above is that under the
customary law of succession of the above tribes males are preferred to females as heirs‖ (citations
omitted) (emphasis omitted)).
126. Id. at 39.
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the constitution should protect her right to inherit.127 To succeed, however,
Magaya had to overcome several constitutional hurdles. First, although
Article 11 of the constitution protects fundamental rights regardless of sex,
Article 23, which provides nondiscrimination protection, did not include
sex or gender as a prohibited ground.128 Magaya, therefore, asked the
Supreme Court to recognize that gender was implicitly included in Article
23. The court briefly assumed arguendo that international law, including
CEDAW, suggests that Article 23 implicitly includes gender equality.
The court avoided a definitive determination on this issue, however,
by perfunctorily deciding that even if Article 23 implicitly included gender
discrimination, Magaya‘s case would fail because other provisions within
Article 23 precluded recovery. Those provisions stated that neither issues
related to personal law, including succession, nor issues related to
customary law would be subject to scrutiny under the nondiscrimination
provisions.129 Magaya‘s efforts to use CEDAW to persuade the court that
she had an equal right to inherit were thus unsuccessful.130
In another case involving gender discrimination under a customary
law of inheritance, the Tanzanian High Court reached a very different
conclusion than the Magaya court.131 In Ephrahim v. Pastory, the court
concluded that the Haya customary law, which prevented women but not
men from selling clan land, was unconstitutional.132 Although it did not
127. See id. at 41 (―The said rule which prefers m[a]les to females as[] heir to the deceased‘s[]
estates constitutes [] prima facie discrimination against females and could therefore be a prima f[a]cie
breach of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
128. See id. The justice quoted the relevant constitutional sections:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section—
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in[] its effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of
any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public
authority.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a law shall be regarded as making a provision that is
discriminatory and a person shall be regarded as having been treated in a discriminatory
manner if, as t[he] result of that law or treatment, persons of a particular description by race,
tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed are prejudiced . . . .
Id. (emphasis omitted). This provision has since been amended to include gender. See CONSTITUTION,
Art.
23
(1979)
(Zimb.),
available
at
www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/
ZimbabweC(rev).doc.
129. See Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. at 41–42.
130. See id. at 41 (finding that Zimbabwe‘s ―adherence to[] gender equality enshrined in
international human rights instruments‖ could not overcome the exemptions from Article 23).
131. See Ephrahim v. Pastory & Another, [1990] L.R.C. 757 (Tanz. High Ct.), reprinted in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TANZANIA, supra note 64, at 397 (―From now on, females all over Tanzania can at
least hold their heads high and claim to be equal to men as far as inheritance of clan land and selfacquired land of their father‘s is concerned.‖).
132. The respondent in the case inherited clan land from her father in a will; however, the
appellant argued that her subsequent sale of the land was void because customary law denied women
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extensively analyze the state‘s obligations under CEDAW or other relevant
international human rights law,133 the court stated that the customary law
―fl[ew] in the face of [the Tanzanian] Bill of Rights as well as the
international conventions to which [Tanzania is a] signator[y].‖134
Another case in which CEDAW played a role is Bhe & Others v
Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others.135 In Bhe, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa contemplated the constitutionality of the customary law rule
of primogeniture as applied in cases of intestate succession.136 The
plaintiff, Bhe, brought suit in the interest of her two minor daughters for
title to their home—a temporary shelter—and the property on which it
stood.137 This property had been acquired by their father, the deceased,
through state subsidies.138 Under South Africa‘s Black Administration Act
of 1927, however, ―the two minor children did not qualify to be the heirs in
the intestate estate of their deceased father.‖139 The court found that the
principle of primogeniture violated the right of women to human dignity as
guaranteed by the constitution.140 In reaching this conclusion, the court
explained that the South African constitution was not alone in its emphasis
on equality, explaining that ―[a] number of international instruments, to
which South Africa is party, also underscore the need to protect the rights
of women, and to abolish all laws that discriminate against them.‖141 The
court cited CEDAW, among the instruments, as support for this statement,
reinforcing the court‘s obligation to strike down the rule.142
Although CEDAW has been used with mixed success to challenge
discriminatory customary laws in Africa, I argue that the Protocol is a
critical supplement to CEDAW in the effort to reform customary law in the
region. As I will discuss in greater detail below, the Protocol obligates
the power to sell clan land. See id. at 388. The court found that the provision of customary laws was
―inconsistent with Article 13 (4) of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which bars discrimination on
account of sex.‖ Id. at 397 (footnote omitted).
133. See id. at 390 (mentioning in passing the U.N. Charter, CEDAW, and the Protocol).
134. Id.
135. Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 633 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.mangaung.co.za/docs/Shibi%20Case.pdf.
136. See id. at 593.
137. See id. at 596.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 597.
140. See id. at 616 (―It is clear . . . that the serious violation by the provisions of [section 23 of the
Black Administration Act] of the rights to equality and human dignity cannot be justified in our new
constitutional order. In terms of s 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, [section] 23 must accordingly be struck
down.‖ (footnote omitted)).
141. Id. at 608–09 (footnotes omitted).
142. Id. at 609 n.58 (citing CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 2(c), (f)).
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states to involve women in the ongoing discourse over the normative
content of customary law and customary practices. Carefully constructed
dialogical processes followed by strategic litigation, when necessary, will
encourage states and traditional leaders to reform discriminatory customary
laws. CEDAW will likely continue to influence courts in resolving
questions of gender inequality, particularly in cases involving
discrimination in the public sphere like Dow. In cases of discrimination
against women in the private sphere, however, the Protocol now
supplements CEDAW in crucial ways and provides another compelling
source of women‘s human rights in the region.143
C. SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES‘ RIGHTS
Whereas CEDAW—both in its text and in the Committee‘s general
recommendations—has failed to explicitly value culture in women‘s lives,
the African Charter, in its valuation of culture, has failed to adequately
protect women‘s rights.144 The right to culture is enshrined in a number of
international and regional human rights treaties.145 Article 27(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that ―[e]veryone has the
right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community.‖146 Article
15.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (―ICESCR‖) provides that individuals have the right to take part in
143. See Mashood A. Baderin, Recent Developments in the African Regional Human Rights
System, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 117, 120 (2005) (noting that ―[t]he substantive guarantees of [the
Protocol] . . . differ in a number of ways from those of CEDAW and the Inter-American Women‘s
Convention,‖ for example, by ―expand[ing] the concept of women‘s rights further than both CEDAW
and the Inter-American Convention by covering more than just non-discrimination and by guaranteeing
an extensive list of rights‖).
144. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that ―where the African Charter on Human and
Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) went overboard is in its wholesale embrace of African traditions, values and
customs without acknowledging that some of these customs and traditions discriminate against and
harm women‖ and that ―the African Women‘s Protocol outlaws traditions such as [female genital
mutilation], widow inheritance and child marriages‖).
145. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (―ICCPR‖) offers
protection to cultural rights and provides that people have a right ―in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture to profess and practice their own religion or to use
their own language.‖ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
Annex, pmbl., art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also Laurence Juma,
Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: Making a Case for Institutional
Reformation and Revitalization of Customary Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 459,
491–92 (2002) (―Several other treaties and regional instruments recognize the rights to culture.‖).
146. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
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cultural life.147 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(―ICCPR‖) provides specific protection for members of ethnic, linguistic,
or cultural minorities to enjoy their own culture.148
Drafted after these international documents, the African Charter built
on the existing protection of cultural rights and expanded that protection.149
The Charter emphasizes cultural rights and attempts to balance
fundamental, universal rights on the one hand, and provide an African
―fingerprint‖ in traditional articulations of fundamental rights on the other
hand.150 As such, the Charter embodies a conscious effort to filter
traditional human rights through an African lens.151 Like the ICESCR, the
Charter explicitly values cultural rights152 and, as such, stands in stark
contrast to CEDAW.
Although the African Charter offers robust protection of cultural
rights, it lacks effective women‘s rights guaranties.153 As Sibongile Ndashe
observes, ―The absence of cases pertaining to women‘s human rights
before the African Commission have, for a long time, been a cause for
concern and it had been speculated that the unclear and potentially
ambiguous provisions of the charter relating to women‘s rights were a
deterrent.‖154 The Commission has yet to examine a single petition alleging
147. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), Annex, art. 15(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (providing that ―States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: [] [t]o take part in cultural life‖).
148. See ICCPR, supra note 145, art. 27.
149. See Angela M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 419, 428–29 (1994) (―By addressing both rights and affirmative duties, the
African Charter expands the scope of human rights in ways unaddressed by other international human
rights regimes.‖ (footnote omitted)).
150. Makau Mutua argues, ―The transplantation of the narrow formulation of Western liberalism
cannot adequately respond to the historical reality and the political and social needs of Africa.‖ Makau
Mutua, The Banjul Charter: The Case for an African Cultural Fingerprint, in CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 68, 69 (Abdullahi A. An-Na‗im ed., 2002).
151. J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A
New Dawn, or Retreating Horizons?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 42 (2000) (noting that in the
African context the realization of rights ―must be expanded to encompass the family and community‖).
―It is also crucially important not to forget the fact that traditional conceptions of human rights in the
African context subsume the interests of the individual to those of the community at large and raise the
correlation between human rights and human duties or obligations.‖ Id. at 42–43 (footnote omitted).
152. See id. at 58 (―The distinctive character of the African Charter has been extolled by
numerous authors, particularly with respect to the recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights.‖
(footnotes omitted)).
153. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that the Charter affirmed cultural rights and
customs that are harmful to women).
154. Sibongile Ndashe, Strategic Litigation: A Tool for Domesticating the Protocol?, in
BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL, supra note 69, at 60, 61.
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a violation of women‘s rights.155 The Charter has, however, been invoked
in conjunction with CEDAW in domestic women‘s rights litigation, such as
the Dow and Ephrahim cases.156 Although women‘s rights activists have
relied on the Charter in a handful of cases, the treaty‘s lack of specificity on
women‘s rights and its emphasis on African cultural values and traditions
suggest that its usefulness is limited.
Aside from a general nondiscrimination provision in Article 2 and an
equal protection provision in Article 3, the Charter‘s primary vehicle for
the promotion of women‘s rights is Article 18.157 Article 18 begins by
describing the family as the ―natural unit and basis of society‖ and ―the
custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the
community.‖158 By framing the family as the guardian of traditional values
and morals, and by articulating a nondiscrimination right in this limited
context, the drafters initially suggest a limited role for nondiscrimination.
In more expansive language, however, Article 18(3) states, ―The State shall
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated
in international declarations and conventions.‖159 Article 18 lacks
specificity and has been widely criticized as unhelpful for women in the
region.160 ―[T]he Charter places emphasis on traditional African values and
155.

Ibrahima Kane, Harmonising the Protocol with National Legal Systems, in BREATHING LIFE
AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL, supra note 69, at 51, 57 (―[I]t is not mere coincidence that that
human rights‘ Commission has not examined a single petition about the violation of women‘s rights in
16 years.‖).
156. See supra notes 116, 133–34 and accompanying text.
157. See Rachel Rebouché, Note, Labor, Land, and Women’s Rights in Africa: Challenges for the
New Protocol on the Rights of Women, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 235, 236 (2006) (―The African Charter
references women only twice . . . .‖).
158. African Charter, supra note 10, art. 18. Article 18 states in relevant part:
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State
which shall take care of its physical health and moral[s].
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and
traditional values recognized by the community.
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international
declarations and conventions.
Id.
159. Id. art. 18(3). The Charter also instructs the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘
Rights to ―draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples‘ rights,‖ including,
presumably, CEDAW. Id. art. 60.
160. See Ssenyonjo, supra note 117, at 44. ―By ignoring critical issues such as custom and
marriage, it has been argued that the Charter inadequately protects women‘s human rights.‖ Id.
(footnote omitted). See also BANDA, supra note 66, at 66–67 (―Despite the existence of the African
Charter and the extensive ratification of CEDAW by African states, it had over time been clear that the
issue of gender was not being seriously considered at the institutional level, with little being done by the
African Commission, which is responsible for monitoring the Charter, to make states parties
INTO THE
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traditions without addressing concerns that many customary practices, such
as female genital mutilation, forced marriage and wife inheritance, can be
harmful or life threatening to women.‖161 An introductory note to the Draft
Protocol explicitly acknowledges that the drafting of the Protocol was, in
part, a response to the perceived inadequacy of the Charter‘s limited
protection of women‘s rights.162
Because the text of the treaty provides more extensive protection to
cultural rights than to gender equality rights, the African Charter fails to
adequately protect women‘s rights when there is a potential clash between
cultural rights and equality rights.163 By strongly privileging rights to
culture over equality rights, the Charter forces women‘s rights advocates to
look elsewhere for support.164 As Mukasa observes, one of the Charter‘s
most significant weaknesses is ―the unsatisfactory manner in which it deals
with women‘s rights.‖165 In contrast to the Protocol, the Charter does not
explicitly, or even implicitly, value women‘s voices in the localized
determination of cultural policies.
CEDAW, too, fails to provide adequate means for resolving heated
contests between equality rights and the right to enjoy one‘s culture.166 It
largely ignores the issue of culture except where it is seen as uniformly
regressive in women‘s lives.167 Ugandan women‘s rights activist and
feminist scholar Sylvia Tamale suggests that this uniformly regressive view
of culture obscures practices that are, in fact, empowering to women.168 As
an example, Tamale discusses the institution of ssenga, or ―sexual initiation
by the paternal aunt,‖ which is practiced within the Baganda community of
accountable for gender-based discrimination occurring within their boundaries.‖).
161. Ssenyonjo, supra note 117, at 44.
162. See BANDA, supra note 66, at 67 (―To date, no African instrument relating to human rights
proclaimed or stated in a precise way what are the fundamental rights of women in Africa. There is thus
a vacuum in the African Charter . . . .‖ (quoting the Protocol drafting process)).
163. See Itoro Eze-Anaba, Domestic Violence and Legal Reforms in Nigeria: Prospects and
Challenges, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 21, 31 (2007) (noting gaps in the Charter‘s gender equality
protections, such as the issue of marriage, and noting that ―the Charter promoted African traditional
values and traditions without due consideration to the harmful effects of some traditional values on
women‖ (footnote omitted)).
164. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 35 (―The charter extols ‗the virtues of historical tradition and
the values of African civilisation,‘ without addressing its vices, which include [female genital
mutilation], child marriages and widow inheritance.‖ (quoting African Charter, supra note 10, pmbl.)).
165. Id. at 33.
166. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
168. See Sylvia Tamale, Makerere Univ., ―African Feminism‖ Taking a ―Cultural Turn,‖
Presentation on the Occasion of the Launch of the African Feminist Forum (Nov. 15–19, 2006),
available
at
http://www.africanfeministforum.org/v3/files/African_Feminism_Taking_Cultural_
Turn.pdf.
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Uganda.169 Although originally focused on men‘s sexual pleasure, the
practice has evolved to allow Baganda women to ―negotiate agency,
autonomy and self-knowledge about their sexuality.‖170 Tamale thus resists
the totalizing view of culture as regressive. Significantly, a regressive or
limited view of culture leads to a narrow perception of women‘s selfidentity and may create a backlash against women‘s rights.171
The Protocol, by contrast, explicitly values the positive aspects of
culture and offers expansive and detailed protection against violations of
women‘s human rights, including those that stem from customary law,
tradition, and cultural practice.172 As such, it strikes an appropriate balance
between valuing women‘s membership in cultural communities and
preventing those cultural communities from harming or discriminating
against female members. Tamale observes, ―[T]he close connection
between gender, sexuality, culture and identity requires that African
feminists work within the specificities of culture to realize their goals. We
need to creatively discard the oppressive aspects of culture and embrace the
liberatory ones.‖173 The text of the Protocol reflects a similar understanding
of the benefits and drawbacks of culture. Moreover, it promotes the notion
that women, as social agents, must play a significant role in determining
cultural policies. In the context of customary law, it values women‘s voices
in formulating and reformulating cultural norms where other international
and regional treaties do not.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id.
171. In her discussion of Swaziland, Sari Wastell provides a compelling example. Wastell
describes the vehemence with which many Swazis resisted the country‘s proposed constitution. ―This
ambivalence was the result of different and cross-cutting political and cultural factors, but the most
important was the fact that human rights discourse, as understood by ordinary Swazis, seemed to
express a value system that was opposed to Swazi custom.‖ Mark Goodale, Locating Rights,
Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, Introduction to THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 1, 34 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry
eds., 2007) (discussing Sari Wastell, Being Swazi, Being Human: Custom, Constitutionalism and
Human Rights in an African Polity, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 320).
172. There is, of course, the difficult issue concerning who decides whether a particular cultural
tradition is positive or negative. Ideally, local women within the communities that practice the tradition
in question will evaluate the costs or benefits of the practice.
173. Tamale, supra note 168, at 5 (footnote omitted).
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III. THE POTENTIAL OF THE PROTOCOL: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCESS
A. REGIONAL CREDIBILITY OF THE PROTOCOL
Compared to CEDAW, the Protocol enjoys substantial regional
credibility.174 The Protocol reflects the voices of African women who
played a role in drafting it.175 As such, it is likely to be a more palatable
source of human rights obligations than international treaties that are seen
as imports of the West.176 Although many international human rights
compacts were negotiated with little input from those whose countries had
been colonized, the Protocol was negotiated directly among many of the
stakeholders who seek to apply it in the region. As Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa‗im remarks, ―Most African and Asian countries did not participate in
the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because, as
victims of colonization, they were not members of the United Nations.‖177
An-Na‗im accepts the universal applicability of human rights law,178 but he
emphasizes the centrality of local context in the internalization of human
rights norms.179 He recognizes that universal norms may become
particularized to the extent that they require localized modes of
implementation. He states, ―[I]t is reasonable to assume that the prospects
for practical implementation of a given regime of human rights as a
normative system are related to the degree of its legitimacy in the context
of the culture(s) where it is supposed to be interpreted and implemented in
174. MUKASA, supra note 13, at 41 (―While the CEDAW‘s effectiveness was undermined in some
quarters because it was considered a Western women‘s instrument, the African Women‘s Protocol is a
homegrown instrument developed by Africans for African women.‖).
175. Id. at 29 (noting that nongovernmental organizations ―played a pivotal role in [the Protocol‘s]
initiation, elaboration and subsequent adoption‖).
176. Id. at 41. ―As an instrument developed by Africans for Africans, [the Protocol] legitimises
the struggle against gender oppression as an African struggle.‖ Id. at 37.
177. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‗im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 (1990) (footnote omitted),
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 317 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001).
178. See id. at 317 (―Concern for the lack of universal participation in formulating international
human rights instruments does not lead me to invalidate those existing instruments.‖).
179. An-Na‗im describes his approach as follows:
I adopt a constructive approach to the problem of the cultural legitimacy of human rights
norms. This approach posits that such problems can be overcome through a process of
reinterpreting the fundamental sources of Islamic tradition. The proposed new interpretation
will have to be undertaken in a sensitive, legitimate manner, and time will be required for its
acceptance and implementation by the population at large.
Id. at 318. See also Elizabeth M. Bruch, Whose Law Is It Anyway? The Cultural Legitimacy of
International Human Rights in the United States, 73 TENN. L. REV. 669, 680–87 (2006) (offering an
excellent description of An-Na‗im‘s approach).
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practice.‖180
The Protocol enjoys regional credibility largely because of the role
African women‘s rights activists played in drafting the document.181 In
1996, the African Commission voted to appoint a Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Women in Africa.182 The Commission later charged the
Special Rapporteur and two commissioners with the task of convening a
working group to draft a protocol on women‘s rights.183 ―As the drafting
process went along, input came from [nongovernmental organizations]
throughout the continent, government legal experts and the Women‘s Unit
of the Organization of African Unity.‖184 Although women‘s rights
activists criticized this early stage of drafting as insular and inaccessible,185
broader coalitions of nongovernmental organizations (―NGOs‖) had an
impact on later drafts. ―In addition to the work of the Special Rapporteur
and her group on drafting the Protocol, contributions to the drafting process
also came from within the [Organisation of African Unity] Women‘s Unit
and civil society.‖186 Drafters incorporated broad concepts of women‘s
rights, drawing on rights provisions in the Southern African Development
Community‘s (―SADC‘s‖) Addendum on Violence Against Women and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.187
As with the drafting of most supranational agreements, urban elites
largely dominated the process. Like any negotiated instrument, the Protocol
reflects this participatory bias and cannot be said to be truly representative
of the concerns of all the women on the continent. The divide between
sophisticated, urban, elite women and poorer, rural women is very real.
Even an effort to include in the drafting process women‘s rights
organizations that work with this rural population will often be insufficient
180. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‗im, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to
Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 99, at 167, 171.
181. See MUKASA, supra note 13, at 5; Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on
Women’s Rights Comes into Force, 50 J. AFRICAN L. 72, 73 (2006) (noting input from NGOs in the
drafting process).
182. See Banda, supra note 181, at 73 (noting that the Special Rapporteur would lead ―a working
group to look into the matter of African women‘s legal disenfranchisement‖).
183. BANDA, supra note 66, at 68.
184. Banda, supra note 181, at 73 (footnote omitted).
185. See Fareda Banda, Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES‘ RIGHTS 441, 445 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (―The initial lack of extensive consultation was to become a source of tension and
unhappiness as the drafting process evolved.‖ (footnote omitted)).
186. BANDA, supra note 66, at 68.
187. See Banda, supra note 185, at 446–47 (―Subsequent drafts moved away from an explicit link
with the African Charter, embracing . . . the SADC Addendum on violence against women, and also the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).‖ (footnotes omitted)).
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to overcome this demographic and experiential bias. The Protocol,
therefore, is not unique in this respect.
In addition to concerns about representation in the drafting process,
the process also involved substantive drafting difficulties. Several states,
including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, attempted to limit the reach of
the Protocol‘s equality provisions.188 Rights related to sexual orientation
were excluded from the final draft.189 Tunisia and Sudan objected to the
provision requiring that the minimum age for marriage be eighteen.190 The
issue of polygamy was particularly contentious, with NGOs proposing an
outright ban and states defending the practice as an important right under
both customary and Islamic law.191 The final version included a
requirement that states parties encourage monogamy as the preferred form
of marriage.192 Like all negotiated international instruments, some of the
Protocol‘s provisions reflect a compromise between conservative
government representatives and consulting NGOs.193
Regardless of these compromise provisions, however, the Protocol
embodies a progressive vision of women‘s rights on the continent, one
which African women played a significant role in creating.194 As a regional
document, the Protocol mediates between global or international
approaches to rights and more localized approaches. The regional and
national NGOs that played a role in the drafting process ―navigate[d] the
divide between the local and the global, translating global approaches into
local terms and seeking to give local groups voice in global settings.‖195 As
such, the Protocol offers an effective rebuttal to those who view human
rights, particularly the rights of women, as a hegemonic import from the
West.196
188. See id. at 447.
189. BANDA, supra note 66, at 77–78.
190. Id. at 78.
191. See id. at 76.
192. Protocol, supra note 12, art. 6(c) (―[M]onogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of
marriage and . . . the rights of women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital
relationships are promoted and protected . . . .‖).
193. See, e.g., Banda, supra note 185, at 449 (noting the example of the qualified rights of women
to pass on nationality to their children under Article 6(h) of the Protocol).
194. See Banda, supra note 181, at 72 (―The entry into force of the Protocol . . . marked the
culmination of years of lobbying for a document which would promote and protect the human rights of
the continent‘s women by African women‘s rights advocates.‖). The drafting process largely involved
women from the urban elite. Knowledge of the Protocol is still limited in rural areas. Thus, although the
Protocol incorporates many of the concerns of African feminists, it should not be understood as a fully
representative and inclusive document.
195. MERRY, supra note 91, at 104.
196. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination, 8
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B. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS WITHIN THE PROTOCOL
The Protocol was entered into force on November 25, 2005.197 As of
February 2008, twenty-three countries had ratified the Protocol.198
Regional, national, and international campaigns continue to increase the
number of ratifications and to promote enforcement of the Protocol within
national legal systems.199 These campaigns are especially important for
women‘s rights activists since the Protocol‘s provisions build on, and in
some cases expand, the rights contained in CEDAW.200 In the case of
violence against women, the value of the Protocol lies in the specificity
with which it prohibits gender-based violence, extending protection well
beyond CEDAW.201
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002) (―The international law of human rights . . . seeks the
universalization of European cultural, philosophical, and political norms and social structures. . . . In
this script of human rights, democracy and western liberalism are internationalized to redeem savage
non-Western cultures from themselves, and to alleviate the suffering of victims, who are generally nonwestern and non-European.‖).
197. MUKASA, supra note 13, at 4. The heads of state and government of the African Union
adopted the Protocol on July 11, 2003, but it did not enter into force until fifteen countries had ratified
it, which occurred with Benin‘s ratification on November 25, 2005. Id.
198. See Equality Now, Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, http://www.equalitynow.org/
english/campaigns/african-protocol/african-protocol_en.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2010) (―The countries
that have ratified the Protocol as of 26 February 2008 are twenty-three: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, The Comoros, Djibouti, The Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo and
Zambia.‖).
199. See, e.g., Equality Now, http://www.equalitynow.org/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). Equality
Now ―has for the past two years been coordinating the campaign for popularisation, ratification and
domestication of the African Protocol on Women‘s Rights. It is registered as an NGO in Kenya.‖
BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL, supra note 69, app. 1, at 98. Another
organization, Association des Juristes Maliennes, has been ―involved in the drafting and lobbying for
the ratification of the Protocol and continues to undertake activities aimed at popularising the Protocol
among their members and other legal practitioners.‖ Id. at 95–96.
200. See Fareda Banda, Remarks, Sex, Gender, and International Law, 100 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L.
PROC. 243, 244 (2006) (―The African Protocol on Women‘s Rights takes CEDAW as its jumping-off
point. . . . Building as it does on CEDAW, it is worth noting that the Protocol contains rights not found
within CEDAW . . . .‖).
201. Although CEDAW brings violence against women within its purview through General
Recommendation 19, the Protocol specifically addresses harmful traditional practices, which can be a
source of violence against women, particularly in rural areas of Africa. Article 5(b) requires states to
take action to ensure ―prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of
female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female genital
mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them.‖ Protocol, supra note 12, art. 5(b). See also
Banda, supra note 200, at 244 (―[T]he Protocol contains rights not found within CEDAW, including
those referring to violence against women. (CEDAW has made up for this by way of two general
recommendations on violence.) The definition of violence is widely drawn and includes economic
harm. Interestingly, pornography and sexist advertising are proscribed. Female genital cutting
(mutilation) is explicitly outlawed even when performed in a medical establishment—thus putting paid
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The Protocol is a response to many of the substantive gaps of
CEDAW and the African Charter,202 seeking to correct CEDAW‘s neglect
of culture and the African Charter‘s prioritization of culture to the neglect
of gender equality.203 Neither CEDAW nor the Charter offers a way to
effectively address the intersectional reality of women‘s lives, a reality in
which both gender equality and custom and culture have an important role
to play.204 Although not without shortcomings, the Protocol is a significant
step forward in terms of meaningfully grappling with the potential conflict
between culture and equality.205
The Protocol contains a number of innovative provisions that move
the culture/equality conversation forward in important ways. First, the
Protocol explicitly values culture and custom at the same time that it
promotes gender equality, which reflects an understanding of the self as
multidimensional, contested, and intersectional.206 By viewing women both
as members of cultural communities and as gender equality–seeking
individuals, the Protocol reflects the lived reality of women‘s existence. As
such, it avoids some of the backlash that CEDAW generates by focusing on
gender equality to the exclusion of other axes of the oppression of women,
such as race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and disability.
In addition to recognizing the positive value of culture and, more
specifically, recognizing the right to live in a positive cultural context, the
Protocol invalidates cultural practices that have a harmful effect on
women.207 Article 2, for example, requires states parties to combat
to the idea that it is only a problem if done in an unhealthy environment.‖).
202. Fareda Banda describes the origins of the Protocol:
The genesis of the African Women‘s Protocol can be traced back to a joint NGO/African
Commission initiative in 1995. At the instigation of a regional women‘s NGO, Women in
Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), the African Commission on Human and
People‘s Rights had organized a meeting to discuss the situation of women in Africa. At the
meeting it was noted that the widespread ratification by African states of the International Bill
of Rights and [CEDAW], all of which protected women from gender-based discrimination,
had not greatly improved the lives of women on the continent. It was further noted that
although African states had ratified [the African Charter], . . . women‘s rights on the continent
were not being enforced. The result of this non-enforcement was that women were continuing
to experience violations of their rights.
Banda, supra note 181, at 72 (footnotes omitted).
203. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
206. See Protocol, supra note 12, art. 17 (providing the right to live in a ―positive cultural context‖
and participate in the formulation of cultural policies); id. art. 1(f) (―‗Discrimination against women‘
means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and whose
objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women,
regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life.‖).
207. See, e.g., id. art. 5. Article 1 of the Protocol defines ―harmful practices‖ as ―all behaviour,
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discrimination against women and includes an obligation to ―prohibit[] and
curb[] all forms of discrimination particularly those harmful practices
which endanger the health and general well-being of women.‖208 Article 2
also specifically requires states parties to challenge gender stereotypes and
―modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and
men . . . with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and
traditional practices.‖209
Article 5, which is entitled ―Elimination of Harmful Practices,‖ is
dedicated to the methods states must use to eliminate harmful cultural or
customary practices.210 As such, the Protocol stands in stark contrast to the
African Charter, which largely failed to address the potential conflict
between the rights to culture and gender equality. Furthermore, while the
language of CEDAW indicates that the right to equality trumps cultural
rights under that treaty, CEDAW lacks credibility on the issue because it
underestimates the importance of culture in women‘s lives and dismisses
culture as almost uniformly repressive.
Articles 6 and 7 address women‘s rights in marriage and divorce,
respectively, which are areas of family law in which customary law often
controls.211 A handful of Commonwealth African countries, in fact, have
clauses in their constitutions that specifically exclude family law from
constitutional nondiscrimination protection.212 The Protocol, however,
makes clear that states have an obligation to conform marriage law—
whether customary, statutory, or religious—to the rights guaranties set
forth in Articles 6 and 7.213 Because the Protocol does not require a
uniform or integrated system of laws, it represents a balanced approach that
allows for the operation of parallel laws but requires that each iteration
eliminate gender discrimination with the law.214
attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as
their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity.‖ Id. art. 1(g).
208. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
209. Id. art. 2(2).
210. See id. art. 5.
211. See id. arts. 6, 7.
212. Bond, supra note 27, at 290.
213. See, e.g., Protocol, supra note 12, art. 6(a) (―States Parties shall ensure that women and men
enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national
legislative measures to guarantee that . . . no marriage shall take place without the free and full consent
of both parties . . . .‖).
214. For example, the Protocol allows for a plural system of laws to govern marriage and divorce
as long as those laws reflect equality norms. See id. arts. 6, 7.
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Similarly, Article 20 provides special protection for widows,215 some
of whom have traditionally been subject to discriminatory and harmful
practices such as the ―cleansing‖ rituals common in Malawi, Zambia, and
Kenya.216 In some circumstances, cleansing rituals require a surviving
widow to have sexual intercourse with one of her husband‘s relatives
following the death of her husband, which exposes her to the violence of
coerced sex and the risk of HIV infection.217 Under the Protocol, however,
states must ensure that widows are not subjected to harmful traditional
practices, signifying another place in which injurious customs must yield to
equality.218 Although it stops short of requiring ―equal‖ rights for women in
inheritance, Article 21 of the Protocol also sets out ―equitable‖ inheritance
rights for women,219 which is another area that customary law has
traditionally controlled.
215. See id. art. 20(a) (requiring states parties to ensure ―that widows enjoy all human rights‖ and
that they not be subjected to ―inhuman, humiliating or degrading treatment‖).
216. See Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Legal Implications of Living with HIV/AIDS in a Developing
Country: The African Story, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT‘L L. & COM. 51, 55 (2004) (―As part of [the widowcleansing] custom, the brother of a deceased husband is expected to have sexual intercourse with the
brother‘s widow, supposedly to ‗cleanse‘ her of her deceased husband‘s spirit, usually with no
obligation to marry her. . . . After the ‗cleansing‘ these women can attend their husband‘s funeral or be
inherited by their husband‘s brother or relative. Not only is such a ritual painful for the women
involved, but it is also a volatile means of spreading AIDS.‖ (footnote omitted)); Sharon LaFraniere,
AIDS Now Compels Africa to Challenge Widows’ “Cleansing,” N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A1 (―[In
Malawi] and in a number of nearby nations including Zambia and Kenya, a husband‘s funeral has long
concluded with a final ritual: sex between the widow and one of her husband‘s relatives, to break the
bond with his spirit and, it is said, save her and the rest of the village from insanity or disease.‖).
217. See Shu-Acquaye, supra note 216, at 55; LaFraniere, supra note 216.
218. Radhika Coomaraswamy, former U.N. Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women,
makes clear that customs that are physically harmful to women must yield to equality rights. See
Coomaraswamy, supra note 4. Coomaraswamy explains that the ―tension between the rights of groups
to practice their culture and the rights of women under international human rights norms plays itself out
in the everyday life of women across the globe,‖ and she presents ―controversy surrounding female
genital mutilation‖ as an example. Id. at 490. Coomaraswamy argues, ―Such practices deserve
international agitation, international legal sanctions, and international programs and policies to combat
the practices so that girls are spared this violence of the most intimate sort, which prevents them from
being human in the most wholesome way,‖ id. at 494; ―[a]t the same time, however, people should
recognize that internationally accepted standards and norms do exist, in defiance of post-modernist
tendencies,‖ id. at 513. Coomaraswamy ultimately concludes, ―Being sensitive to cultural relativism
cannot imply putting hard-won battles on human rights up for grabs. . . . What must be seen as
negotiable are the strategies of enforcement and implementation and not the bottom line concept of a
woman free and equal. Id. at 513.
219. Article 21 states:
1. A widow shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her
husband. A widow shall have the right to continue to live in the matrimonial house. In case of
remarriage, she shall retain this right if the house belongs to her or she has inherited it.
2. Women and men shall have the right to inherit, in equitable shares, their parents‘
properties.
Protocol, supra note 12, art. 21.
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These articles of the Protocol offer strong protection for women‘s
equality rights. When there is a perceived conflict between customary law
or practice and gender equality, the Protocol overwhelmingly resolves the
conflict in favor of equality.220 Yet it does so within a framework that
explicitly values the positive aspects of custom and culture, likely reducing
the backlash that often results from external threats to community values
and norms.221 In addition to recognizing the positive value of culture, the
Protocol also provides procedural protections that offer women a voice in
the determination of cultural policies and practices.222
C. BENEFITS OF THE PROTOCOL‘S PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Article 17 of the Protocol, which states that women have the right ―to
participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies,‖ 223 offers
the strongest protection for women‘s right to engage with and influence
cultural policies. Article 17 also requires that states parties ―take all
appropriate measures to enhance the participation of women in the
formulation of cultural policies at all levels.‖224 It is worth noting, however,
that the Protocol‘s drafters could have used stronger obligatory language,
such as a requirement that states ―ensure‖ rather than ―enhance‖ the
participation of women in the formulation of cultural policies. Although the
drafters failed to utilize the most compelling language in this instance, the
Protocol‘s repeated specific mention of ―communication‖ is another
discursive method of challenging gender-based stereotypes.225 These
220. See BANDA, supra note 66, at 81 (―On the issue of culture, the document is firm in its
injunction that culture is to be rooted in principles of equality and democracy, and that women are to be
consulted about the content of the cultural norms that are to operate within their societies.‖ (citing
Protocol, supra note 12, pmbl., art. 17)).
221. See An-Na‗im, supra note 8, at 5 (―Those of one cultural tradition who wish to induce a
change in attitudes within another culture must be open to a corresponding inducement in relation to
their own attitudes and must also be respectful of the integrity of the other culture. They must never
even appear to be imposing external values in support of the human rights standards they seek to
legitimize within the framework of the other culture.‖).
222. See Protocol, supra note 12, art. 17.
223. Id. art. 17(1).
224. Id. art. 17(2).
225. Article 2(2) states:
States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
women and men through public education, information, education, and communication
strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional
practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.
Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, Article 4(2)(d) requires that states ―actively promote peace
education through curricula and social communication in order to eradicate elements in traditional and
cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimise and exacerbate the persistence and tolerance
of violence against women.‖ Id. art. 4(2)(d) (emphasis added).
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procedural provisions, which are often overlooked in discussions of
women‘s rights, offer an underutilized vehicle to promote women‘s
engagement with the laws and policies that often determine the outcome of
family law disputes.
The emphasis on women‘s participation in the determination of
cultural policies is an attempt to create decisional space for women to
interpret and engage with cultural meaning.226 These provisions reflect an
understanding of the importance of women‘s agency in articulating the
normative content of customary law, and they seek to enhance women‘s
participation in the discourse surrounding culture and custom.227 Because
the Protocol does an excellent job of framing gender equality norms in the
context of custom and culture, the real discursive value of Article 17 is its
potential to engage traditional leaders in the exploration of localized
methods for implementation of equality rights.228
As I discuss in greater detail in Part V, NGOs have a crucial role to
play in operationalizing the Article 17 right of women to participate in the
formulation of cultural policies. As Merry observes, ―Movement activists,
NGO leaders, and government officials create programs and institutions
that are a blend of transnational, national, and local elements as they
negotiate the spaces between transnational ideas and local concerns.‖229
Merry proposes a strategy for NGOs attempting to ―translate‖ ideas
between global and local spaces as part of this process. The translation
strategy is useful for NGOs seeking to facilitate discourse between, for
example, traditional leaders and grassroots women in Africa. Among other
things, NGOs should use culturally relevant ―images, symbols, and stories‖
to create a ―frame‖ of discourse. ―Frames are . . . ways of packaging and
presenting ideas that generate shared beliefs, motivate collective action,
and define appropriate strategies of action.‖230 Framing strategies will help
NGOs to structure the dialogue, introduce ideas that challenge patriarchal
traditions, and, when appropriate, search for frames that are culturally
resonant.231 Leaders of NGOs, of course, must acknowledge that
organizations are not always inclusive or representative of the communities
226. See id. art. 17; BANDA, supra note 66, at 252 (recognizing Article 17 as a reaction against the
well-perceived ―misuse of culture to deny women their rights‖).
227. See infra Part V.
228. See infra Part V.
229. MERRY, supra note 91, at 134.
230. Id. at 136.
231. Choosing culturally resonant frames is not always appropriate. Id. (―This is precisely the
problem human rights activists confront: If they frame human rights to be compatible with existing
ways of thinking, they will not induce change.‖).
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they purport to serve. In addition, local NGO agendas may actually reflect
the priorities of transnational funders rather than those of domestic or local
NGO leadership. These challenges of inclusiveness and funder-driven
priorities may complicate the efforts of NGOs to implement Merry‘s vision
of global-local translation.
Merry is not alone in her emphasis on the importance of participation.
Recent strains of feminist legal and political theory also underscore the
importance of procedural, participatory protections.232 I argue, however,
that these participatory, dialogical rights, while important, may lead to
outcomes that are a product of power dynamics rather than true
deliberation.233 As a result, I see the value of discourse not in substantively
defining equality norms but in exploring localized modes of
implementation and acculturating traditional leaders to international human
rights norms such as those embodied in the Protocol.234 It is the discursive
search for localized modes of norm implementation, rather than norm
definition, that holds the greatest promise for promoting women‘s equality
rights in the region.
IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
The Protocol‘s procedural provisions, such as Article 17, embody a
deliberative approach to women‘s rights in customary law and cultural
232. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL
ERA 11 (2002) (―[O]nly those norms and normative institutional arrangements can be deemed valid
only if all who would be affected by their consequences can be participants in a practical discourse
through which the norms are adopted.‖); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 121–22
(2000) (―[I]n a large polity with many complex issues formal and informal representatives mediate the
influence people have. For these reasons many recent calls for greater political inclusion in democratic
processes argue for measures that encourage more representation of under-represented groups,
especially when those groups are minorities or subject to structural inequalities.‖). See generally Angela
M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1043 (2008) (discussing internal inclusion of individual participants as a fundamental
requirement of successful participatory constitutionmaking and substantive decisionmaking).
233. According to one scholar, ―[A]lthough idealized versions of deliberative democracy require
‗the inclusion of everyone affected by a decision,‘ failure to account for the effect of social inequalities [sic] on civic participation and political inclusion can render the norm of inclusion
ineffectual.‖ See Monique Deveaux, A Deliberative Approach to Conflicts of Culture, 31 POL. THEORY
780, 785 (2003) (quoting JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRACY 16 (2000)).
234. Cf. MERRY, supra note 91, at 219 (―Human rights ideas and feminist ideas are appropriated
by national elites and middle-level social activists and translated into local terms. Those who are most
vulnerable, often the subjects of human rights, come to see the relevance of this framework only
through the mediation of middle-level and elite activists who reframe their everyday problems into
human rights terms.‖).
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practice.235 In the contemporary conflict over multiculturalism and
equality, deliberative democracy theorists have gained traction in recent
years.236 Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats share a core
understanding of ―the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their
representatives.‖237 Thus, the process of decisionmaking becomes highly
significant in mediating the conflict between demands for pluralism and
equality.238 The Protocol‘s deliberative, procedural approach complements
its strong substantive provisions and allows for a comprehensive advocacy
strategy that includes both litigation and localized, discursive political
decisionmaking.
Using the lens of deliberative democracy to explore the transformative
potential of the Protocol forces one to confront the structural problems,
such as power differentials between discursive participants, that are likely
to impede equality-promoting discourse at the local level in Africa. This
skepticism concerning the effect of power on discourse leads me to
conclude that, in the case of localized discussions regarding gender equality
within African customary law, efforts to supplement the weak position of
particular participants through better procedures—although helpful—will
be inadequate. An alternative to relying solely on procedure to promote
fair, equality-promoting discourse is to reduce the scope of deliberation.
As I will discuss below, discourse is most helpful not in defining the
norms of equality-based customary law but in providing an avenue for
discussion of local implementation of such norms. Because significant
power disparities typically exist between traditional leaders and rural
women, deliberative democracy should be cautiously evaluated as a tool for
resolving the rights contests that often arise in the context of gender
equality and customary law. For the reasons described below, I conclude
235. See supra text accompanying note 222.
236. See Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism 1 (Inst. for Advanced
Studies, Vienna, Political Sci. Series, Working Paper No. 72, 2000), available at http://www.ihs.ac.at/
publications/pol/pw_72.pdf (―[T]he new paradigm of democracy, the model of ‗deliberative
democracy‘ . . . is currently becoming the fastest growing trend in the field.‖).
237. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).
Gutmann and Thompson define deliberative democracy as
a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and
generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on
all citizens but open to challenge in the future.
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
238. Deveaux, supra note 233, at 802–03 (―By putting members of cultural communities at the
center of debates and decision-making processes about the future of their cultural practices, we express
formal respect and equal regard for them as citizens and as members of groups—surely a moral
requirement of plural, liberal states.‖).
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that deliberation is an inappropriate vehicle to determine the content of
human rights norms. It is, however, a useful method for facilitating local
dialogue about the best way to implement human rights norms and for
raising awareness about those norms within traditional communities.
This localized discourse allows for some variation in the modes of
implementation, including those that have some resonance within
traditional communities.239 Viewed in this way, discourse helps to
acculturate traditional leaders regarding the value of human rights norms,
and it facilitates the exploration of common ground between traditional
values and human rights norms.240 I advocate a limited role for discourse
ethics in the context of African customary law and equality rights, one that
serves not to identify appropriate norms but merely to aid in the
internalization of human rights norms, particularly in traditional
communities that have long been resistant to such norms.
In addition to limiting the scope of discourse concerning culture and
equality, I advocate the use of litigation as a strategic supplement to
political discourse.241 When discourse between traditional leaders and
women‘s rights advocates results in regression in implementing women‘s
human rights, as it inevitably will at times, litigation serves as another
critical tool in the activist toolbox. This combination of discourse, focused
on norm implementation, and strategic litigation designed to enforce
equality rights within customary law holds great promise for women‘s
rights activists in the region.
A. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: AN OVERVIEW
Commentators describe the basic tenet of the theory of discourse
ethics, which forms the foundation for deliberative democracy, as the
notion that ―[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a
239. It is a mistake to assume that a uniform dissonance exists between traditional practices and
human rights. Such assumptions risk missing the potential for finding common ground.
240. As Angela Banks describes: ―Adaptation is the process by which international legal
obligations and norms are translated into local terms through the use of strategic frames. The strategic
frames utilized situate the international obligations and norms within the local discursive opportunity
structure.‖ See Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 781, 795 (2009) (footnote omitted). ―State collaboration
with local elites, respected individuals within the local legal, political, economic, religious, and social
communities, is often necessary to facilitate adaptation.‖ Id. at 798. See also text accompanying notes
229–31.
241. See generally Bond, supra note 27 (arguing that constitutional litigation is a form of dialogic
constitutionalism that is helpful in the struggle to achieve women‘s equality in sub-Saharan Africa).
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practical discourse.‖242 Many discourse ethicists imagine a formal system
of argumentation between individuals.243 Other deliberative democrats
have expanded notions of discourse to include organizations, the state, and
communities among possible dialogical participants.244 Because conflicts
between traditional leaders and grassroots activists in Africa often involve
significant power disparities between participants, this expanded
recognition of organizational participants opens the door for institutions or
organizations to engage in dialogue and potentially to help level the playing
field.245
Discourse ethicists offer a vision of ―an intersubjective procedure of
argumentation, geared to attain communicative agreement.‖246 As such, the
242. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 93 (Christian
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983) (footnote omitted). According to
Amy Bartholomew, ―Ultimately, the thrust of Habermas‘s discourse-theoretic approach to legitimacy
indicates that the determination and legitimation of human rights standards must rest on public
justification and deliberation, aimed at producing mutual understanding, under procedural conditions of
freedom, political equality and publicity.‖ Amy Bartholomew, Human Rights and Post-Imperialism:
Arguing for a Deliberative Legitimation of Human Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25, 46 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
243. As Chantal Mouffe notes:
As recalled by Benhabib, the features of such a discourse are the following: ―(1) participation
in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same
chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; (2) all have the
right to question the assigned topics of the conversation; and (3) all have the right to initiate
reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they
are applied and carried out.‖
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 86 (2000) (quoting Seyla Benhabib, Toward a
Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in SEYLA BENHABIB, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 70 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)).
244. See Russell A. Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to SelfDetermination, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 341, 358 (2006–07) (explaining that Habermas‘s discursive
democracy ―typically characterizes the conditions for just relations between individuals, leading to the
creation of governing institutions and the norms those institutions apply‖ and extending that theory, ―as
the proper manifestation of self-determination, to interactions between those groups and another
collective, namely the state‖). ―In answering skepticism about the ability of NGOs and social
movements to function as will-forming entities in Habermasian democratic discourse, Samhat explained
that ‗NGOs and social movements can be representative agents . . . in world politics, implementing
tasks and aggregating interests and voices for segments of the global polity . . . .‘‖ Id. at 362 (alterations
in original) (quoting Nayef H. Samhat, International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy,
WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT‘L REL., Winter/Spring 2005, at 179, 186)).
245. Miller continues:
Samhat also urges the application of the principles of Habermasian discursive democracy to
the interactions between collectives. In mapping the discursive democratic potential of
regimes, Samhat noted that ―international regimes are the means through which state and nonstate actors regulate areas of global life.‖ He regarded non-state actors operating in this
capacity as ―group oriented‖ and referred specifically to ―global civil society actors such as
[NGOs] and social movements.‖
See id. at 361–62 (quoting Samhat, supra note 244, at 180, 182).
246. SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 28 (1992).
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focus is decidedly procedural. Some, like Seyla Benhabib, prescribe the
conditions necessary for such argumentation to be successful, including
inclusiveness and reciprocity.247 Benhabib describes these conditions as:
―the principle of universal moral respect,‖ meaning that ―we recognize the
right of all beings capable of speech and action to be participants,‖248 and
―the principle of egalitarian reciprocity,‖ by which she means ―that within
such conversations each [person] has the same symmetrical rights . . . to
various speech acts, to initiate new topics, [and] to ask for reflection about
the presuppositions of the conversation.‖249
Although discourse ethics is associated with strict proceduralism,
these rules convey a substantive vision of fairness within dialogue.250
Benhabib, among others,251 notes that substance and process are
interrelated and observes, ―[A]ssumptions about self, reason and society are
the ‗substantive‘ presuppositions without which no ‗proceduralism‘ . . . can
be cogently formulated.‖252 Benhabib, who accepts the general discourse
ethics framework previously discussed, adjusts it based on insights from
feminist philosophy. For example, many theorists require that dialogic
participants shed the particularized experiences that shape their
perspectives and, instead, focus on general principles ―that all can agree
247. See id. (―Furthermore, there is also a shift from the model of the goal-oriented or strategic
action of a single agent intending a specific outcome to the model of communicative action which is
speech and action to be shared with others.‖).
248. Id. at 29 (emphases omitted).
249. Id. (emphasis omitted).
250. ―[T]he deliberative conception relies on explicitly moral principles rather than the seemingly
neutral ones of aggregative conceptions. Reciprocity is an explicitly moral principle. Deliberation
therefore invokes substantive moral claims that may be independent of the preferences citizens put
forward.‖ GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 237, at 18–19. Gutmann and Thompson further note:
While deliberation is now happily married to democracy—and Habermas deserves much of
the credit for making the match—the bond that holds the partners together is not pure
proceduralism. What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of
who is included in the process of deliberation—an inclusive answer to the questions of who
has the right (and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators, and to whom
do the deliberators owe their justifications.
Id. at 9–10.
251. Gutmann and Thompson describe the conflict between deliberative democrats who view the
theory as procedural or substantive:
This conflict concerns the status of the principles of the theory: should they be procedural or
substantive? Pure proceduralism holds that the principles should apply only to the process of
making political decisions in government or civil society. Thus the principles should not
prescribe the substance of the laws, but only the procedures by which laws (such as equal
suffrage) are made and the conditions necessary for the procedures to work fairly (such as
free political speech). . . . Deliberative theorists who favor a more substantive conception
deny that procedural principles are sufficient. . . . Unjust outcomes, they assume, should not
be justifiable on any adequate democratic theory.
Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
252. BENHABIB, supra note 246, at 7.
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on.‖253 Benhabib, however, critiques this notion that the ―other‖
participants in the dialogue shed the particularities of their pasts.254 As
Chantal Mouffe observes, ―[I]t is unlikely, given the practical and
empirical limitations of social life, that we will ever be able to completely
leave aside all our particular interests in order to coincide with our
universal rational self.‖255
Although Benhabib does not eschew moral universals, she encourages
respect for ―concrete particular others in their narrative contexts.‖256 Rather
than endorse the discourse ethicist‘s conclusion that only impartiality will
lead to reasoned agreement and consensus, Benhabib urges that dialogic
participants consider the ―other‖ in all of its messy particularity and
contextual history.257 Through this process of particularized, discursive role
reversal, participants will achieve moral respect and understanding.258 Iris
Marion Young takes the critique one step further, however, by arguing that
Benhabib is unrealistic in her assumption that role reversal with the
concrete other is possible when participants enjoy vastly different positions
253. Habermas believes that self-definition is accomplished intersubjectively, through social
interaction with others. Johanna Meehan writes:
Habermas‘s appreciation for the intersubjective constitution of identity is expressed in his
belief that we become selves through social interaction; we are not first individuals and then
social agents who relate to each other; personal identity essentially involves social identity
and the constitution of the self is concomitant with the establishment of relationships in the
context of a shared lifeworld.
Johanna Meehan, Autonomy, Recognition, and Respect: Habermas, Benjamin, and Honneth, in
FEMINISTS READ HABERMAS: GENDERING THE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE 231, 240 (Johanna Meehan ed.,
1995). See also Iris Marion Young, Comments on Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self, 62 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 165 (1994).
254. Benhabib summarizes the critiques as follows:
Communitarians, feminists and postmodernists have (1) voiced skepticism toward the claims
of a ―legislating‖ reason to be able to articulate the necessary conditions of a ―moral point of
view,‖ an ―original position,‖ or an ―ideal speech situation;‖ (2) they have questioned the
abstract and disembedded, distorting and nostalgic ideal of the autonomous male ego which
the universalist tradition privileges; (3) they have unmasked the inability of such universalist,
legislative reason to deal with the indeterminacy and multiplicity of contexts and lifesituations with which practical reason is always confronted.
BENHABIB, supra note 246, at 3.
255. Mouffe, supra note 236, at 6.
256. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 39 (1997).
257. See BENHABIB, supra note 246, at 137 (explaining the importance of ―the interpretation of
one‘s action and maxims in light of the narrative history of the self and others‖). Benhabib argues,
―[T]he more we are able to think from the perspective of others, all the more can we make vivid to
ourselves the narrative histories of others involved.‖ Id.
258. Benhabib notes:
All communicative action entails symmetry and reciprocity of normative expectations among
group members. . . . Universalizability enjoins us to reverse perspectives among members of a
―moral community‖ and judge from the point of view of the other(s). Such reversibility is
essential to the ties of reciprocity that bind human communities together.
Id. at 31–32.
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of privilege and oppression.259
In the context of African customary law, a discourse about equality
norms between traditional leaders and rural, grassroots women illustrates
Young‘s point. Benhabib would urge traditional leader participants to
consider the particularities of life as a woman living under customary law. I
share Young‘s skepticism that powerful elite participants, such as
traditional leaders, are capable of deep understanding outside of their
privileged frame. Effective deliberation, then, aims not to fancifully erase
the differences of privilege but to minimize their impact on discourse.260
Discourse ethicists also believe that we should reach agreement about
the rules that govern us through reasoned argumentation. This reasongiving process, in fact, is what gives legitimacy to the governing rules.261
When dialogic participants provide reasons for their position within an
―ideal speech situation,‖ they accomplish three goals. First, the reasons
establish participants as active agents in their own governance—as subjects
rather than objects of law.262 Second, they help to define and justify the
rules that govern us.263 Third, they have expressive value; the process of
reason giving conveys mutual respect.264
B. THE POWER CRITIQUE
Discourse theory offers a useful starting point in thinking about
deliberation and its role in democratic processes. Many discourse ethicists,
such as Jürgen Habermas, however, insufficiently theorize the effect of
power on discourse. Although Habermas sees freedom from domination as
a precondition for the ideal speech situation,265 he offers little insight into
the operation of power in communicative acts. Commentators have noted
259. See Young, supra note 253, at 170 (―The reciprocal recognition by which I know that I am
other for you just as you are other for me cannot entail a reversabililty of perspectives, precisely
because our positions are partly constituted by the perspectives each of us has on others.‖).
260. See Mouffe, supra note 236, at 14 (noting that ―if we accept that relations of power are
constitutive of the social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to eliminate power
but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic values‖).
261. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 237, at 10 (―The general aim of deliberative
democracy is to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics.
In pursuing this aim, deliberative democracy serves four related purposes. The first is to promote the
legitimacy of collective decisions.‖).
262. See id. at 3 (noting that in various conceptions of democracy ―[p]ersons should be treated not
merely as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part
in the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives‖).
263. Id. at 4.
264. Id.
265. See BENHABIB, supra note 232, at 107.
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that consensus may be reached through communication devices, such as
rhetoric, rather than through reasoned argument.266 ―In rhetoric, ‗validity‘
is established via the mode of communication—for example, eloquence,
hidden control, rationalization, charisma, and using dependency relations
between participants—rather than through rational arguments concerning
the matter at hand.‖267 Viewed in this way, power—rather than
rationality—becomes the central medium through which discourse is
accomplished.268
On the question of power, critics offer considerable insight into the
structural inequalities that may underlie and undermine a particular
communication.269 Discourse ethicists are not unconcerned about power.
Some worry about power as a corrupting influence in deliberation.270
―Practices of deliberative democracy also aim to bracket the influence of
power differentials in political outcomes because agreement between
deliberators should be reached on the basis of argument, rather than as a
result of threat or force.‖271 Most discourse ethicists, however, offer little
more than an idealized theoretical speech situation in which such power is
theoretically neutralized.272 Indeed, they generally recognize that this
266. See YOUNG, supra note 232, at 63 (―[I]n his theory of discourse ethics Habermas also aims to
distinguish rational speech from rhetoric, the first of which has a communicative and the second a
strategic function. . . . Rhetorical speech, on the other hand, aims not to reach understanding with
others, but only to manipulate their thought and feeling in directions that serve the speaker‘s own ends.‖
(footnote omitted)).
267. Bent Flyvbjerg, Ideal Theory, Real Rationality: Habermas Versus Foucault and Nietzsche 5
(Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Political Studies Association).
268. See id. ―The [Habermasian] neglect of power is unfortunate, because it is precisely by paying
attention to power relations that we may achieve more democracy.‖ Id. at 8. As Monique Deveaux
writes:
An important limitation of any democratic approach to resolving conflicts of culture
concerns the problem of genuine as opposed to purely formal inclusion. Even where political
exclusion of some group members, such as women, is not explicit, it may be difficult to
ensure that those who have been historically disenfranchised actually participate in
deliberation.
MONIQUE DEVEAUX, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN MULTICULTURAL LIBERAL STATES 92 (2006).
269. As Michel Foucault states:
The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every
point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because
it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 93 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
270. See DEVEAUX, supra note 268, at 106 (―If I am right that struggles over the meaning and
validity of contested cultural traditions in liberal states are centrally about the concrete interests of
group members and the distribution of power and decision-making authority in these communities, then
arguably any sound procedure for mediating cultural conflicts ought to recognize this.‖).
271. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY 670,
672 (2001).
272. As Mouffe observes, ―Th[e] link between legitimacy and power and the hegemonic order that
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idealized communication cannot readily be achieved in current practice.273
Young‘s construction of a fictional dialogue between an activist and a
deliberative democrat provides a subtle critique of deliberative
democracy.274 The activist‘s strong moral convictions about what is right
and wrong may lead the activist to reject dialogue, particularly if the other
participants are—in the activist‘s view—oppressive.275 In the eyes of the
activist, ―[a]ctivities of deliberation . . . tend more to confer legitimacy on
exi[s]ting institutions and effectively silence real dissent.‖276 The
deliberative democrat regards the activist with some degree of contempt as
the activist represents the polarized political power plays that deliberative
democracy intends to circumvent.277
Young‘s activist is suspicious of the deliberative democrat‘s insistence
on inclusion, at least in the real-world version of deliberation rather than
the idealized theory. Referring to this idealized, theoretical version of
discourse, Young remarks, ―This is not the real world of politics . . . where
powerful elites representing structurally dominant social segments have
significant influence over political processes and decisions.‖278 The activist
feels the process will never be truly inclusive when deliberation threatens
the power, property, or prestige of elites.279 Even if a deliberative process is
formally inclusive, the activist worries that the politically powerful will
continue to control the agenda and dominate the discussions.280 The
this entails is precisely what the deliberative approach forecloses by positing the possibility of a type of
rational argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is grounded on pure
rationality.‖ Mouffe, supra note 236, at 14.
273. ―As ideal, the theory [of deliberative democracy] expresses conditions that often operate as
implicit regulative norms guiding social co-operation, but which are never perfectly realized.‖ YOUNG,
supra note 232, at 33. As Mouffe observes, ―[T]he ideal speech situation is presented as a ‗regulative
idea.‘‖ Mouffe, supra note 236, at 6.
274. See generally Young, supra note 271 (revealing the limits of deliberation when institutional
power imbalances are present).
275. Id. at 673 (―Typically, the activist eschews deliberation, especially deliberation with persons
wielding political or economic power and official representatives of institutions he believes perpetuate
injustice or harm. He finds laughable the suggestion that he and his comrades should sit down with
those whom he criticizes and whose policies he opposes to work out an agreement through reasoned
argument they all can accept.‖).
276. Id. at 675.
277. See id. at 674 (―Some who see themselves guided by norms of deliberative democracy might
say that activists engage in interest group politics rather than orienting their commitment to principles
all can accept. They might also say that the stance of the activist is flatly unreasonable.‖).
278. Id. at 677.
279. Young suggests, ―Where there are structural inequalities of wealth and power, formally
democratic procedures are likely to reinforce them, because privileged people are able to marginalize
the voices and issues of those less privileged.‖ YOUNG, supra note 232, at 34.
280. See Young, supra note 271, at 679 (―The activist is more suspicious even of these
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discussion is already constrained, the activist avers, through its reliance on
extant institutions that embody the structural inequality against which the
activist rails.281
Young also warns of ―hegemonic discourses that may produce false
consensus.‖282 Both Young and James Bohman suggest that actual public
discourse may suffer from false consensus when structural inequalities
impede
legitimate
discourse
through
―falsifications,
biases,
misunderstandings, and even contradictions [in frames of discussion] that
go unnoticed and uncriticized largely because they coincide with
hegemonic interests or reflect existing social realities as though they are
unalterable.‖283 Some critics would go further and assert that ―every
consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony.‖284 At a
minimum, every consensus is vulnerable to the charge that it was reached
through the exertion of power rather than rational argument.
This is particularly true in the context of dialogue involving traditional
leaders and rural women in Africa. Although Article 17 of the Protocol
offers a useful way to encourage localized discourse about customary law
and to facilitate women‘s engagement in the discourse, I advocate a
pragmatic approach that reflects the limits of discourse in this context.
Theorists like Mouffe, Benhabib, and Young point to discursive limitations
such as the inability of participants to shed particularized experiences, the
effect of particularized experiences on the exertion of (or inability to exert)
power, and the ways in which power operates even in seemingly neutral
discursive procedures. These limitations on the transformative potential of
discourse suggest that a cautious approach to deliberation is most prudent
in the context of African customary law.
deliberative processes that claim to give all affected by projected policies . . . the opportunity to express
their opinions in a deliberative process. In a society structured by deep social and economic inequalities,
he believes that formally inclusive deliberative processes nevertheless enact structural biases in which
more powerful and socially advantaged actors have greater access to the deliberative process and
therefore are able to dominate the proceedings with their interests and perspectives.‖).
281. Young writes:
Some public officials and private foundations have become persuaded that inclusive, reasoned
extensive deliberation is good for democracy and wish to implement these ideals in the policy
formation process. To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained
alternatives that cannot question existing institutional priorities and social structures,
deliberation is as likely to reinforce injustice as to undermine it.
Id. at 684.
282. Id. at 686.
283. Id.
284. Mouffe, supra note 236, at 17.
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V. LOWERING EXPECTATIONS OF DELIBERATION: A PROPOSAL
A. PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATION
1. Customary Law and Traditional Leadership
Colonialism changed the role of local, traditional leaders in
decisionmaking and the degree to which they engaged in consultation with
their constituencies. In the precolonial period, traditional leaders did not act
in a formal representative capacity.285 Their leadership lacked clearly
delineated powers and was ―both diffuse and all-inclusive.‖286 Traditional
leaders were charged with an undefined duty to act in the interests of the
people.287 Traditional leaders typically consulted a group of elders or
councilors as part of the decisionmaking process.288 This consultation
allowed a leader to informally take stock of popular opinion, although the
leader was not duty bound to do so.289 The consultative process, in theory,
provided a check on ―self-interested or capricious action.‖290
T. W. Bennett describes the changes brought about through the British
colonial policy of indirect rule. Through indirect rule, the British colonial
authorities consolidated power in some indigenous leaders by ―co-opting
[them] to the colonial administration.‖291 As a result, the traditional leaders
no longer felt the need to consult elders since they had the support of the
285. See T. W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 68 (1995) (―[A]
leader ‗did not normally enjoy a continuing unquestioned right to command[;] . . . his authority had to
be continually recreated situationally, in specific contexts. This is expressed in the formula that chiefs
could not rule on their own, but only in constant consultation with their councillors and people.‘‖
(quoting W. D. HAMMOND-TOOKE, COMMAND OR CONSENSUS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSKEIAN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 65 (1975); David Hammond-Tooke, The “Other Side” of Frontier History: A
Model of Cape Nguni Political Progress, in AFRICAN SOCIETIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 230, 248
(Leonard Thompson ed., 1969))).
286. Id. at 66–67.
287. See id. at 67 (―They were the fathers of their nations and they were talked about in the idiom
of kinship. Like parents, African rulers had to care for their people, judge disputes fairly, govern the
nation wisely, and provide for the needy.‖ (footnote omitted)).
288. See id. (―A ruler kept in touch with popular opinion through his councillors—the warheads
and elders—who were normally senior kinsmen and notable leaders in the community‖ (footnote
omitted)).
289. See id. at 67–68 (noting that a leader‘s rule was ―circumscribed only by a vague duty to act
for the benefit of his people‖ but that ―[n]o important decision could be taken without prior
consultation‖).
290. See id. at 68 (noting that councilors ―gave voice to popular views‖ as a means of limiting the
leader‘s prerogative).
291. Id.
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colonial administration.292 Welshman Ncube asserts:
[M]ost of what is today held out as ―our‖ customary law is a
―construction‖ of the colonial judiciary in complicity with some elders of
the African society, who redesigned most of what is today presented as
customary law so as to increase male authority and control over women
and children, to compensate for the loss of their political and social
power to the colonial state.293

When colonialism ended, many newly independent governments
maintained the basic structure of traditional leadership.294 Although the
quality of leadership varies widely as with any political system, some
allege that traditional leaders tend to be ineffective and dishonest.295
Traditional leaders, nevertheless, enjoy considerable respect within local
communities.296
Some governments, such as South Africa, have a new democratic
constitution and have preserved the traditional leadership structure in the
constitution.297 The traditional leadership has not always embraced the
values of the new constitution. In the drafting phase, for example,
traditional chiefs in South Africa lobbied to exclude personal and
customary law from the purview of the nondiscrimination provision in the
constitution.298 They argued that personal law should be shielded from
292. Id. Also, as An-Na‗im states:
For decades, colonial powers exercised exclusive control over local populations by ruling
through a few educated local elite and traditional rulers and the extensive use of divide and
rule tactics. All that independence signified in most African states was the transfer of control
over authoritarian power structures and processes of government from colonial masters to
local elite. Notions of popular participation in governance and accountability of officials at
the national and local level were never known to African societies during colonial rule or after
independence.
An-Na‗im, supra note 105, at 13.
293. Welshman Ncube, The White Paper on Marriage and Inheritance in Zimbabwe: An Exercise
in Superfluity and Mischief?, LEGAL F., No. 4, 1993, at 10, 12.
294. See BENNETT, supra note 285, at 69–70 (―[S]carcely any new African state could afford to
dispense with [indigenous leaders].‖ (footnote omitted)).
295. See id. at 69 (noting that many indigenous leaders ―have a reputation as stooges of the
apartheid regime, and many are said to be inefficient and corrupt‖ (footnotes omitted)).
296. See id. at 70 (―Even where deliberative attempts were made to depose or sideline traditional
authorities, they continued to thrive. This is because the institution—rather than the individual officeholder—still enjoys considerable public support. . . . [N]otwithstanding its faults, [local government of
traditional authorities] is more in touch with community sentiment than the central state. For ordinary
people their leaders are a legal and constitutional horizon, a personification of the moral and political
order, protection against injustice, unseemly behavior, evil and calamity.‖ (internal quotation marks
omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
297. See Yvonne Mokgoro, The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution, 41
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1279, 1288 (1997).
298. See Bond, supra note 27, at 323 (citing Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, “No Nation Can
Be Free When One Half of It Is Enslaved”: Constitutional Equality for Women in South Africa, in THE

DO NOT DELETE

560

7/5/2010 1:36 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:509

constitutional scrutiny, which would have left most South African women
without nondiscrimination protection in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and
other areas that dramatically affect women‘s day-to-day lives.299 A strong
and organized women‘s rights lobby eventually defeated that effort.300 The
conflict, however, illustrates the potential for traditional leaders to reject
efforts to empower or give voice to women.
Colonialism resulted in less consultation between traditional chiefs
and their constituencies. This reduction in dialogue about the nature and
content of customary law meant that decisionmaking was less democratic
and more reflective of the desires of individual chiefs and their colonial
backers.301 In addition, colonialism ossified customary law, stunting its
natural evolution by recording it in an ―official‖ version recognized by the
colonial administration.302 Both of these historical developments affected
the level of discourse concerning customary law and the potential of that
discourse to facilitate the evolution of customary law.
2. Discourse Ethics Applied: Traditional Leadership and Women‘s Rights
When deliberation results in consensus, what is the longevity of that
decision? Deliberative democracy allows for a ―rolling‖ dialogue in which
previously answered questions may be reopened for consideration.
According to Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, ―Deliberative
democracy‘s provisionality checks the excesses of conventional
GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 230, 231 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds.,
2005)).
299. See Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 298, at 231.
300. See Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women’s Status: An Examination
of Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 65, 78
n.101 (2006) (―In response to [the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa‘s] proposal to
exempt customary law from the Bill of Rights, black women delegates led a fight to oppose it. In
addition, when a compromise clause was suggested that limited the right to equality, various rural
women‘s organizations sent submissions opposing the clause.‖ (citing Jill Zimmerman, Note, The
Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 197, 206–07 (2001))).
301. See BENNETT, supra note 285, at 68 (stating that ―indirect rule‖ under colonialism had the
effect of ―weakening the checks and balances that had moderated traditional rule‖ because African
leaders ―had no need to look to their subjects for acceptance or approval,‖ as ―their authority was
supported by the full weight of the colonial state‖).
302. The recording process even resulted in generating ―Restatements of Customary Law‖ in
some areas. See Armstrong et al., supra note 46, at 327. ―Whatever the real motives behind these
exercises, they contributed to the ossification process and with the other sources of custom became part
of the system of precedent.‖ Id. Notably, the version of customary law that was recorded and
entrenched was often relayed by traditional authorities and therefore perhaps reflected their interests
more than those of the general population. See id. at 326–37.
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democracy‘s finality.‖303 Deliberative democracy‘s provisionality, in fact,
mirrors the dynamic nature of customary law, making customary law a
good conceptual fit for deliberative democracy.304 Commentators
increasingly view African customary law as a ―living‖ law that changes and
adapts to new circumstances. As a dynamic system of law and rules, it is
particularly well suited to ongoing examination through discourse. The
evolving nature of customary law also makes it capable of responding to
social, economic, and legal changes. Recognition of this dynamism may
encourage traditional leaders to come to the table to explore how best to
conform customary law to equality norms and the ways in which
traditional, indigenous understandings may complement equality norms.305
In addition to being dynamic, customary law is highly contested,
which also makes it well suited for democratic deliberation.306 Customary
law is typically unwritten, indigenous law that is passed down from one
generation to another. Attempts to codify customary law have been
criticized for freezing customary law in a particular iteration. Proponents of
living customary law implicitly recognize the contested nature of the law as
it is continually evolving.307 Viewing customary law as a ―work in
303. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 237, at 19.
304. ―[T]he [deliberative democratic] procedures for evaluating and, if necessary, reforming
contested cultural customs . . . are democratic and practically grounded; as such, they can generate
proposals that are both democratically legitimate and politically viable in their reflection of cultural
practices and communities in flux.‖ DEVEAUX, supra note 268, at 227–28.
305. For example, in Shilubana v Nwamitwa, the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered
whether to uphold a royal family‘s decision to grant a daughter the right to succeed her father‘s
chieftainship title, even though the customary laws of succession followed the principle of male
primogeniture. See Shilubana & Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) ¶ 3 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/9.pdf. The chief died without a male heir and was initially
succeeded by his brother instead of his eldest child, a daughter. Id. The elders modified the rule almost
thirty years later to allow the daughter‘s chieftainship, arguing it was necessary ―to bring [the
community‘s] customs and traditions in line with the new constitutional order.‖ Id. ¶ 33. Proponents of
the decision argued that such change was common in customary law, which is a ―flexible, living system
of law, which develops over time to meet the changing needs of the community.‖ Id. ¶ 35. The court
ultimately decided, after balancing the value of community-led change with the need for legal stability
and certainty, see id. ¶¶ 76–84, that the traditional authorities had the power to develop their customary
law in an effort to ―affirm constitutional values,‖ see id. ¶ 84. The case serves as a prime example of
both the dynamic nature of customary law and the ability of customary law to incorporate gender
equality norms.
306. Benhabib emphasizes the variable, contested nature of culture. She identifies the following as
―faulty epistemic premises‖ concerning culture:
(1) that cultures are clearly delineable wholes; (2) that cultures are congruent with population
groups and that a noncontroversial description of the culture of a human group is possible;
and (3) that even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence, . . . this
poses no important problems for politics or policy.
BENHABIB, supra note 232, at 4.
307. See Armstrong et al., supra note 46, at 314, 327 (―By living law we mean ‗the unwritten
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progress‖ lends it to open contestation regarding its normative content and,
more importantly, regarding the most effective means of implementing
human rights norms within particular communities.308
In the context of discussions regarding the normative content of
African customary law, Bohman‘s and Young‘s concerns about false
consensus resulting from structural inequalities are magnified.309
Traditional leaders are primarily male elites who enjoy significant social
and political power,310 which was transformed and cemented with the
assistance of the colonial powers.311 Women who challenge customary
norms as violative of gender equality rights often enjoy considerably less
political power within their communities. Furthermore, the act of openly
challenging custom and tradition exposes those women to increased stigma
and ridicule within the community. Unity Dow, who challenged
Botswana‘s discriminatory nationality law, describes her feelings of
ostracism after bringing suit: ―The traditionalists charged that I was
influenced by foreign ideas and that I was seeking to change their
culture. . . . Many women distanced themselves from me.‖312
If civil society organizations, with or without the help of the state, are
successful in bringing together traditional leaders and grassroots women to
respectfully deliberate over issues like divorce or inheritance, women may
feel empowered and engaged as a result. This depends, in part, on whether
participating women feel as though their voices have been heard. At a
minimum, participants must strive to achieve Benhabib‘s two requirements
for effective discourse: universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity.313
irregular, [or] flexible and highly negotiable, custom representing the law governing the actual social
life of the people in their day to day lives often changing in response to changing conditions‘. Although
we understand that there may be debate on whether this constitutes ‗law‘, it is clearly the body of rules
and actions which has the most effect on the day to day lives of most people, and particularly women.‖
(citation omitted) (quoting Rwezaura, supra note 46)).
308. For example, ―third world [feminist] critics are generally loath to accept a static
understanding of culture, and often deconstruct popular or state articulations or propogation of culture
in an attempt to find room for women to challenge dominant understandings of their culture.‖ Engle,
supra note 40, at 64–65.
309. See supra notes 232–33.
310. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 285, at 66 (―Regardless of which colonial title an
autochthonous ruler had to bear, in the eyes of his people he was the most important and the most
powerful member of his nation.‖).
311. See id. at 68.
312. Unity Dow, How the Global Informs the Local: The Botswana Citizenship Case, 22 HEALTH
CARE FOR WOMEN INT‘L 319, 326–27 (2001).
313. See BENHABIB, supra note 246, at 29. In a more recent volume, Benhabib expands on these
normative requirements, specifically in the context of multiculturalism and gender equality, to include
egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and freedom of exit and association. She argues that
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Building on the notion of the ideal speech situation,314 Benhabib stresses
that the normative concepts of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity
ensure that everyone has the right to participate in dialogue and that
participants are equally entitled ―to various speech acts, to initiate new
topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation,‖
and so on.315 Given the very real structural inequalities between traditional
leaders and grassroots women, civil society organizations, along with the
state, must carefully structure the dialogue to minimize barriers to women‘s
meaningful participation.
B. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF DELIBERATION
As Monique Deveaux observes:
An idealized model of deliberation that either denies the force of
participants‘ interests and relative power in determining dialogical
outcomes, or else rules out certain kinds of reasons in advance in the
hope that these will not impact deliberation, may succeed only in
reinforcing the advantages enjoyed by powerful participants in
deliberation.316

Deveaux‘s discomfort with the power dynamics of deliberation leads her to
emphasize inclusiveness, strategic negotiation, and compromise in
deliberation.317 Unlike many deliberative democrats, Deveaux concludes
that deliberation should be focused on participants‘ strategic interests and
the potential for pragmatic compromise.318 I share her skepticism about the
potential of deliberation to arrive at truly inclusive consensus, but I differ
with Deveaux regarding the strategies for addressing this concern.
―as long as these pluralist structures do not violate three normative conditions, they can be quite
compatible with a universalist deliberative democracy model.‖ BENHABIB, supra note 232, at 19.
314. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 296 (William Rehg trans.,
1996) (―Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises,
and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair
results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been
obstructed.‖).
315. See BENHABIB, supra note 246, at 29.
316. See DEVEAUX, supra note 268, at 105–06.
317. See id. at 107–12.
318. Deveaux states:
If I am right that struggles over the meaning and validity of contested cultural traditions in
liberal states are more centrally about the concrete interests of group members and the
distribution of power and decision-making authority in these communities, then arguably any
sound procedure for mediating cultural conflicts ought to recognize this. In practical terms,
this suggests that reason-giving in deliberation ought not to be restricted to normative claims,
nor privilege identity claims, but rather should permit—and even at times foreground—the
strategic and pragmatic concerns and needs of cultural members.
Id. at 106.
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In a radical break from discourse ethicists such as Benhabib and
Young, I argue that the best way to limit the effect of power disparities is to
limit the subject matter of discourse to localized modes of norm
implementation. Discourse ethicists, including Benhabib and Young, would
balk at the notion that the scope or subject of discourse could or should be
limited. As Mouffe observes, ―Habermas . . . defends what he claims to be
a strictly proceduralist approach in which no limits are put on the scope and
content of the deliberation.‖319 For discourse ethicists, as long as the
procedural prerequisites are met, there is no need to worry about the
outcome.320 It is precisely because the procedural prerequisites can never
be satisfied, however, that I am concerned about substantive outcomes.
Because discursive approaches are not exclusively procedural (they are
always/also substantive), it is better to accept, quite explicitly, what the
substantive boundaries are rather than let the undisclosed/unexamined
substance of unrecognized privilege distort the discourse.
Rather than simply encouraging inclusion and focusing deliberation
on participants‘ strategic interests, I propose limiting the scope of
deliberation. Rather than attempting to arrive at consensus through
discourse, which is impossible given the very real power disparities at play,
I advocate accepting as consensus the regional human rights norms
articulated in the Protocol and focusing deliberation on the best ways to
implement those norms at the local level. Although this does not neutralize
power disparities, it does focus the discourse in a way in which basic
human rights norms are not threatened by illiberal discursive outcomes.
What is at stake instead is the discussion of the ways in which those norms
may be realized at the local level. Throughout this localized discussion of
implementation, dialogical participants may find that the human rights
norms in question incorporate or resonate with local custom in many ways.
Where the two conflict, the actors in the discourse must determine the
precise parameters of the right, but the discourse does not question the very
existence of the right.321
319. See Mouffe, supra note 236, at 5. Mouffe states:
For the habermasians, the process of deliberation is guaranteed to have reasonable outcomes
to the extent that it realizes the condition of the ―ideal discourse‖: the more equal and
impartial, the more open the process is, and the less the participants are coerced and ready to
be guided by the force of the better argument, the more [sic] the higher is the likelihood that
truly generalizable interests will be accepted by all those relevantly affected.
Id. at 5–6.
320. See, e.g., Deveaux, supra note 233, at 795 (―The emphasis that my proposed model of
deliberation and conflict resolution places on democratic legitimacy, and the relative minimalism of the
principles to serve as procedural constraints, leaves the outcome of deliberation wide open.‖).
321. In some ways, this approach is similar to the European Court of Human Rights‘ use of the
doctrine of ―margin of appreciation,‖ which gives states some latitude in implementing the rights
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To do so, this localized, inclusive deliberation about modes of
implementation will inevitably involve discussion of the kind of strategic
interests that Deveaux envisions. For example, traditional practitioners of
female genital mutilation (―FGM‖), many of whom are older women in
rural areas, have an economic interest in the continuation of the practice.322
Of course, many of the practitioners believe deeply in the cultural value of
the practice as well. I advocate a localized discourse that focuses on the
realization of the right to be free from gender-based violence. That
discourse would explicitly include a discussion among participants about
(1) ways that the community might preserve the important rite-of-passage
ritual without causing physical or emotional pain and, therefore, without
contravening international and regional human rights law; and
(2) alternative methods of income generation for FGM practitioners.
Deveaux is correct in her assessment that strategic interests have a role to
play in democratic deliberation,323 but I argue that the discussion of
strategic interests must take place in the context of a discourse that is
limited in scope to localized norm implementation and must reflect the
Protocol‘s commitment to facilitating women‘s voices in the dialogue.
In rejecting many of the fundamental tenets of discourse ethics, I align
myself more closely with An-Na‗im than with the discourse ethicists
discussed herein. An-Na‗im, too, values discourse but is unwilling to
abandon rights to the discursive process. He remarks, ―I believe not only
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. The court enforces implementation of the
rights in the Convention but recognizes that there may be some international variation in the specific
modes of implementation. See, e.g., Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Derogation
and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 73 (1995) (―The doctrine
holds that in the application of a number of the Convention‘s provisions . . . a respondent government
should be allowed a measure of discretion. . . . [The Convention organs] should confine themselves to
deciding whether the government‘s assessment is sustainable, and should not seek to make their own
independent re-assessment of the underlying issues.‖).
322. See EFUA DORKENOO, CUTTING THE ROSE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: THE PRACTICE
AND ITS PREVENTION 50 (1994) (―Part of the reason for the continuation of the practice of FGM lies in
the fact that it is an irreplaceable source of revenue for excisors.‖).
323. This, too, is a departure from the traditional discourse ethics approach. Discourse ethics and
democratic deliberation have traditionally rejected the notion that strategic interests are an appropriate
subject of deliberation, preferring instead the search for moral universals. James Bohman observes that
all models of deliberative democracy ―reject the reduction of politics and decision making to
instrumental and strategic rationality.‖ JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM,
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY 5 (1996). Deveaux argues:
A model of political deliberation that privileges moral discourse may give individuals and
groups ample incentive to present their interest-based concerns in terms of cultural identity
claims that may or may not speak to the crux of the issue. . . . [T]he desire to maintain one‘s
own status or the status of one‘s subgroup within the wider community, to shore up one‘s
position of power vis-à-vis others, or to further one‘s own financial gain, do not make for
good reasons in moral deliberation.
DEVEAUX, supra note 268, at 105.
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that universal cultural legitimacy is necessary, but also that it is possible to
develop it retrospectively in relation to fundamental human rights through
enlightened interpretations of cultural norms.‖324 An-Na‗im explicitly
rejects the notion that human rights should be limited to those rights that
are acceptable to all peoples in all nations. This ―least common
denominator‖ approach unnecessarily restricts rights.325 Instead, An-Na‗im
―accepts the existing international standards while seeking to enhance their
cultural legitimacy within the major traditions of the world.‖326 Because the
Protocol enjoys regional credibility and reflects the drafting efforts of
African activists, it is one step closer to the cultural legitimacy that AnNa‗im seeks.
Building on An-Na‗im‘s work, I argue that the Protocol sets out the
normative human rights framework that must then be the subject of
discourse at the local level to determine the best, most resonant methods of
implementation within a particular community.327 The Protocol‘s human
rights framework thus becomes the dialogical starting point, with the goals
of discourse being (1) to identify the most effective methods for local
implementation of norms and (2) to acculturate communities to respect
human rights. In the FGM example above, the localized discourse would
focus on implementation of the right to be free from gender-based violence,
including discussion of the strategic interests of FGM practitioners and
raising awareness about women‘s human rights among traditional leaders
who might be resistant to human rights norms.
If the structural inequalities inherent in discourse about African
customary law are so great, why not forsake discourse altogether?
Although I am unwilling to sacrifice women‘s human rights to the
potentially illiberal outcome of deliberation, I envision a more
circumscribed role for dialogue in the context of human rights. Situating
the Protocol‘s regional human rights norms a priori in discourse and
focusing the discourse on implementation of those rights reflect several
324. See An-Na‗im, supra note 8, at 20–21.
325. See id. at 21 (―[R]estricting international human rights to those accepted by prevailing
perceptions of the values and norms of the major cultural traditions of the world would not only limit
these rights and reduce their scope, but also exclude extremely vital rights.‖).
326. Id. An-Na‗im believes that cultural legitimacy can be enhanced through internal dialogue and
the ―struggle to establish enlightened perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms.‖ Id.
at 27.
327. The Protocol has the potential to achieve the goal articulated by An-Na‗im, ―to broaden and
deepen universal consensus on the formulation and implementation of human rights through internal
reinterpretation of, and cross-cultural dialogue about, the meaning and implications of basic human
values and norms.‖ Id. at 21.
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discursive assumptions.
First, this approach assumes that localized discourse about the
substantive content of human rights has the potential to roll back important
rights guaranties. Second, the approach ascribes a privileged place for the
Protocol as a regional expression of women‘s human rights. The
assumption here is that the regional drafting process reflects the
participation of African women, albeit an urban elite.328 As such, the
Protocol‘s articulation of rights already reflects a more localized discourse
on the substantive content of rights than its international counterparts, such
as CEDAW. Third, limiting the scope of deliberation will not eliminate the
power disparities that necessitate the approach in the first place. Limiting
deliberation to norm implementation merely contains the reach of structural
inequalities. Rather than deliberation focused on identifying the core
meaning of rights, discourse focuses on the implementation of rights,
allowing for slight variation in implementation depending on local realities
and strategies. This approach, therefore, recognizes a normative baseline
(in the form of the rights articulated in the Protocol) and facilitates
localized discourse regarding implementation that informs and is informed
by those norms.329
One problem remains. If traditional leaders remain hostile to equalitybased cultural change, is it realistic to imagine that they would voluntarily
engage in constructive dialogue with African feminists? For the dialogic
process to work under these circumstances, two institutions must be fully
mobilized in support of my version of limited-scope deliberative
democracy. First, the state must promote and facilitate the dialogue.
Although it is perhaps counterintuitive to involve the state in a dialogic
process that is decidedly non-state-centric, the dialogue can be neither truly
deliberative nor truly democratic without some procedural safeguards
established by the state.330 Second, civil society, including an active and
328. The fact that the Protocol reflects the concerns of cosmopolitan, elite African feminists is not
an insignificant problem. According to Gayatri Spivak, the solution to this problem lies in privileged
feminists learning to remain silent and listen to and learn from their less privileged peers. See generally
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF
THE VANISHING PRESENT (1999).
329. An-Na‗im recognizes that rights dialogue is a two-way street in the sense that internal
discourse regarding rights also has the potential to shape the cross-cultural or international
conversations regarding the content of rights. See An-Na‗im, supra note 8, at 27 (―Internal discourse
relates to the struggle to establish enlightened perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and
norms. Cross-cultural dialogue should be aimed at broadening and deepening international (or rather
intercultural) consensus.‖).
330. This assumes a reasonably well-functioning and largely beneficent state. Obviously, this is
not always the case.
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organized nongovernmental base, must be integrally involved in promoting
the (re)examination of cultural norms in light of human rights guaranties.
The only way to ensure that the discourse is inclusive and fair, such
that it would induce a rural woman to participate in the dialogue, is to
involve the state. The government has an obligation under the Protocol to
ensure that women have a right to ―participate at all levels in the
determination of cultural policies.‖ Assuming a genuine desire on the part
of the state to fulfill its obligations under the Protocol, the state must play a
role in organizing and facilitating the dialogue. The role of the state,
however, must be facilitative, and representatives of the government must
be cognizant of and work to remedy the power disparities that stem from
their affiliation with the state.
Civil society also has a role to play to ensure that the discourse is
inclusive, fair, and respectful. In the African customary law context,
participants in the dialogue will sometimes enjoy alarmingly different
levels of power. Traditional leaders represent an elite, largely male group
that has benefited from considerable influence at the local level even in the
postcolonial period. Rural women in many parts of Africa generally do not
enjoy the same status within the community. By organizing women in rural
areas and by facilitating the expression of their collective voice, NGOs may
be able to level the playing field enough to sustain a constructive dialogue
about the normative content of culture and customary law.
Amelia Vukeya, an attorney with the Aids Law Project in South
Africa, provides a compelling example of discursive collaboration between
the state, civil society, and traditional leaders. The government of South
Africa has, in collaboration with NGOs, systematically engaged traditional
leaders in dialogue concerning efforts to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS
in the country. In its effort to implement the National Strategic Plan on
HIV, the government articulated a commitment to ―facilitate [and] sustain
dialogue with cultural, religious and traditional leaders.‖331 According to
Vukeya, the dialogue has been productive and has led to a deeper
understanding of the issues on all sides.332
Similarly, Merry describes the approach of Merilyn Tahi, director of
the Vanuatu Women‘s Centre, noting that Tahi works to integrate local
331. See Amelia Vukeya, Customs and HIV/AIDS in South Africa: Engaging Traditional
Leadership in the Fight Against HIV/AIDS (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(adapted from Amelia Vukeya, Presentation at the Fordham Law School Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice Conference, The Role of Customary Law in the 21st Century: African
Customary Law Revisited (Oct. 23–24, 2008)).
332. See id.
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chiefs into community discussions about domestic violence. Tahi describes
―bringing the local chiefs or church pastors into the process, inviting them
to meetings, including them in discussions with her . . . and getting them
involved in opposing domestic violence.‖333 As Merry observes, ―These are
examples of efforts to tailor programs to local cultural conditions in a way
that recognizes and works through the power relationships of the local
community.‖334 At the same time, carefully facilitated dialogue challenges
the existing community power relationships by explicitly valuing the
contributions of less powerful dialogic participants.
The government role in facilitating this type of dialogue is largely,
although not exclusively, architectural. Governments often have more
resources than civil society organizations, making it easier for a
government to convene or ―host‖ such dialogues. Importantly, this model
of systematic engagement with local communities must extend beyond
urban areas, thereby increasing the financial cost of the endeavor.
Geographic breadth is important, as is strategic incorporation of NGOs.
The active involvement of government and civil society affords some
control, albeit limited, over the content and process of discourse. With
women‘s rights, if NGOs are ensuring women access to, inter alia, the
process of agenda setting, content control, and methods and rules of
discourse, the dialogue will be less likely to produce Young‘s and
Bohman‘s ―false consensus.‖ Civil society organizations must be vigilant
in correcting the problem of power disparities through their careful
structuring of and engagement with the dialogue concerning customary
law. With the careful attention Young advocates, NGOs in Africa may
effectively facilitate engagement between women‘s rights activists and
traditional leaders. To do so, they must go beyond strict, formalized notions
of discourse and embrace a healthy skepticism concerning formal
argumentation and aggressively counter power imbalances within the
discourse.
C. FLUIDITY AND SYMBIOSIS OF LITIGATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA
It is neither necessary nor preferable to wholly subvert substance to
333. See MERRY, supra note 91, at 164.
334. See id. Merry cautions, however,
There is an important difference between a top-down program seeking to be culturally
sensitive in terms of an essentialized idea of culture and a locally controlled program that
recognizes the complexity of local cultural ideas but allows local groups to tailor the program
to the power dynamics and symbolic resources of the situation in which they work.
Id.
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process. Because the discourse ethicist‘s ideal speech situation is
unattainable given political realities, a deliberative process may lead to
illiberal outcomes. What then? If traditional leaders in Tanzania sit down
and deliberate with a group of grassroots women and cannot reach an
agreement about how best to implement the substantive norm of gender
equality, does a human rights advocate have recourse? Or worse, what if
the traditional leaders are successful in steering the discourse away from
modes of implementation and toward a rollback of substantive equality
rights?
I argue that the juridical process provides a backstop.335 Likewise, the
process of public deliberation in the face of ongoing litigation often creates
support for and ―buy in‖ to equality-promoting changes in the law.
Benhabib also recognizes the value of a ―dual-track‖ approach in which
juridical and political processes complement one another.336 I take
Benhabib‘s analysis one step further in the African context. I advocate a
fluid conception of the relationship between litigation and political
discourse. To that end, I make two claims. First, I argue that the line is
already blurred; discursive engagement occurs not only in the political,
dialogical context but also in the litigation context. Several recent cases
from South Africa illustrate the point. Second, I argue that litigation
provides an essential corrective to illiberal outcomes resulting from
discourse.
If we view discourse as a method of acculturation to and
internalization of human rights norms, rather than as a method for defining
those norms, we avoid many of the concerns about corruptive power
inherent in the discourse ethics model. Although civil society and the state
still have a critical role to play in leveling the discursive playing field (to
the extent possible), the threat of false consensus is less troubling than it
would be if we viewed discourse as defining the relevant human rights
norms. Rather, localized discourse should be viewed as an exploration of
the best methods to implement extant human rights standards at the local
level. As such, the discourse has expressive value; it suggests that careful
implementation of human rights norms is desirable and that traditional
leaders are valued participants in the discursive effort to implement those
norms. Viewed in this way, litigation may legitimately serve as a backstop
335. In arguing that litigation is an important corrective tool, I recognize that there are many
obstacles facing African women who attempt to use the judicial system. See generally WOMEN & LAW
IN S. AFR., IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: WOMEN AND JUSTICE DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE (2000).
336. BENHABIB, supra note 232, at 106.
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to discourse concerning implementation.337
I propose a more fluid understanding of the relationship between the
two tracks and the role of deliberation in both the juridical track and the
political track. Drawing on recent jurisprudence from the South African
Constitutional Court, I argue that the Constitutional Court has already
begun to blur the lines between deliberative processes and traditional
litigation. In the Bhe case, the South African Constitutional Court struck
down the customary rule of male primogeniture.338 Not surprisingly, the
case generated a great deal of public discussion. Before making its ruling,
the Constitutional Court requested an amicus brief from the National House
of Traditional Leaders.339 The Constitutional Court specifically sought to
engage traditional leaders in a conversation, albeit a judicially sanctioned
one, in which the traditional leaders could express why they resisted a
change that would allow women to inherit property on an equal basis with
men. Despite the court‘s efforts to solicit input from the chiefs, the group of
traditional chiefs did not submit an amicus brief.340 Nevertheless, the court
signaled that the chiefs should be part of the conversation and responded by
inviting them to engage with the court on the subject of the continuing
validity of male primogeniture.
In a series of cases involving socioeconomic rights, the South African
Constitutional Court has more explicitly invited dialogue—or, in its terms,
―engagement‖—between civil society and the state. In doing so, the
Constitutional Court has invoked deliberative norms.341 In one housing
rights case, the Constitutional Court observed:
In seeking to resolve the above contradictions, the procedural and
substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always be separated. The
managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative
ways. Thus one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving
sustainable reconciliations of the different interests involved is to
encourage and require the parties to engage with each other in a pro337. Conversely, if we viewed discourse as a way of defining human rights norms, the notion of
litigation as a backstop would so directly undermine the discursive value of the deliberative process as
to render it meaningless.
338. Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.), available
at http://www.mangaung.co.za/docs/Shibi%20Case.pdf.
339. Id. at 593.
340. See id.
341. For a fascinating discussion of ―engagement‖ as a hybrid dispute resolution mechanism, see
Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanisms to Develop Constitutional
Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Human Rights & Global Justice,
Working Paper No. 21, 2008).
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active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions. 342

The court‘s willingness to ―engage‖ the parties in dialogue
demonstrates a commitment to deliberation in the context of litigation
rather than solely in political decisionmaking. The court also envisioned a
role for itself in the ongoing supervision of the engagement process. The
court may intervene if the parties fail to demonstrate a willingness to
engage or if the results of engagement are ―unreasonable.‖ The court,
furthermore, endorses a role for civil society organizations that is similar to
the one I advocate in this Article. The court stated elsewhere, ―Civil society
organisations that support the peoples‘ claims should preferably facilitate
the engagement process in every possible way.‖343
For litigation to serve as a backstop to discourse, activists must be able
to invoke the progressive rights provisions common in the wave of African
constitutional reforms of the 1990s. Elsewhere, I have criticized the
constitutions of several Commonwealth African countries for specifically
excluding personal or family law from the purview of constitutional
nondiscrimination protection.344 In Lesotho, for example, constitutional
equality guaranties do not apply to ―adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death or other like matters which is the personal
law of persons of that description.‖345 Activists in countries such as
Lesotho, which specifically exclude family law from constitutional
protection, will experience more difficulty using litigation as an advocacy
supplement to facilitated discourse. Those activists will have to turn to
international human rights law, including the substantive provisions of the
Protocol, if applicable, to argue that the family or customary law in
question violates binding international norms.
I have been a vocal advocate of constitutional amendment to eliminate
these ―exclusionary clauses‖ and thereby bring family and customary law
within the purview of constitutional nondiscrimination protection. I have
relied on theories of dialogic constitutionalism to argue that women should
use constitutional litigation to challenge and shape personal and customary
law. There is dialogic value in the constitutional litigation process itself.
342. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) ¶ 39 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/7.html.
343. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd. v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) ¶ 20 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/1.html.
344. See Bond, supra note 27, at 291 (―Although many of the independence constitutions in
Commonwealth Africa articulated a commitment to gender equality, the exclusion of personal and
customary law from constitutional protection has severely undermined that commitment.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
345. CONSTITUTION § 18(4)(b) (Lesotho).
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―The constitution becomes an important, although not the only, vehicle
through which to redefine and reshape cultural meaning, allowing women
to challenge dominant cultural norms without abandoning culture
altogether.‖346
Similarly, in the context of the right to participate in the formulation
of cultural policies, litigation plays a crucial role. If discourse fails or leads
to illiberal outcomes, advocates may use litigation as a backstop. In other
words, they may—indeed, should—explore litigious avenues as an
alternative, complementary way to promote women‘s equality rights. When
carefully facilitated discourse between women‘s rights activists and
traditional leaders fails, as it will from time to time, litigation provides
another avenue to pursue women‘s equality rights within customary law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Protocol holds great promise to create lasting change for women
in countries that have ratified it. Because the Protocol was entered into
force as recently as 2005, it is too early to determine if the African Union
will effectively implement the treaty.347 Assuming, at this stage, that the
political will exists to implement it, the Protocol provides a crucial vehicle
for promoting women‘s rights on the continent. The Protocol explicitly
values the positive aspects of custom and culture. As such, it recognizes the
importance of community membership for women, even as women
advocate for equality within their communities. In so doing, it will likely
generate less hostility than CEDAW, which is dismissive of positive
cultural contexts.
Although imperfect in its substantive coverage, the Protocol fills
critical lacunae left by CEDAW and the African Charter. Whereas
CEDAW oversimplifies issues of culture and custom, the African Charter
fails to adequately protect women‘s rights under the treaty. Provisions in
the Protocol strike an appropriate balance between culture and equality
when conflicts arise, recognizing the positive aspects of culture while
invalidating customs that are harmful to women.
Largely unnoticed procedural provisions in the Protocol hold great
promise for facilitating women‘s critical engagement with the customs and
practices that shape their lives. These provisions, if effectively
operationalized, will give women a much-needed voice in discussions
346.
347.

Bond, supra note 27, at 329.
See generally Baderin, supra note 143 (discussing human rights developments in Africa).
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regarding the normative content of customary law. Insight from political
philosophy, particularly from discourse ethics and its critics, demonstrates
the need for state and civil society involvement in the architecture of the
discourse. Such involvement is necessary to minimize dramatic power
disparities between traditional leaders and grassroots, rural women.
Through careful and sustained engagement with traditional leaders, such as
that envisioned by the Protocol, grassroots women may find a liberating,
collective voice in the ongoing examination of customary law.

